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BARTH'S CONCEPT AND CRITICISM OF RELIGION 
Abstract of Thesis presented to the University of Durham for the Degree of 
Master of Arts, by Edgar C Ruddock B.A. Dip.Th: 
The Thesis is set within the pastoral problem of how Karl Earth was to 
preach meaningfully to his congregations. For this study, the problem of 
religion was raised through concern over the relationship between 
institutional religion and living faith; over questions about the content of 
religious language, and the relevance of a largely conceptual religion to 
the concrete thought-forms of modem urban man. 
The study begins with an assessment of the significance of Earth's early 
years and theological development, and then moves on to sketch in some 
of Earth's major theological themes. There then follows a textual analysis 
of Earth's commentary on Romans Chapter 7, and the section in the 
Church Dogmatics (12) entitled The Revelation of God as the Abolition 
of Religion*. These are compared and contrasted, and linked to some 
biblical themes. The question of religion is then set in its historical context, 
attention being paid to Earth's understanding of the problem of religion 
in theology, to the distinctive characteristics of nineteenth century theology 
as they affected Earth's thought, and also to the debate between 
Karl Earth and Adolph von Hamack. 
Next attention is paid to Earth's methodology, assessing particularly the 
significance for the concept of religion of the Dialectical Method, and then 
more specifically of the influence on Earth of S r^en Kierkegaard. The final 
section seeks to explore the way forward, assessing Earth's concept of 
true religion, and then asking what light is thrown on the concept of 
religion by Martin Euber. The thesis then concludes with a brief assessment 
of the significance of Earth's critique of religion for the modem church. 
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1. 
EARTH'S CONCEPT AND CRITICISM OF RELIGION 
a) General: Introduction 
I t is no mere co-incidence that some of the most formative times in the 
thinking of Karl Earth were the years he spent in pastoral work in Switzerland, most 
notably those at Safenwil. The context of his theological development was a deep 
concern for the people among whom he worked. What was i t that he could 
meaningfully preach to them week by week? In what way could the Christian message 
be proclaimed in the emerging and fast changing world of the twentieth century ? 
I t is from a similarly practical problem that fliis present study has been 
inspired. The question that has prompted a study of the concept 'religion' is one that 
has presented itself on different levels: on one level i t concerns the relationship of 
institutional religion to living faith; on another, it raises the question of the content of 
religious language and the relationship between symbol and reality; and on yet another 
level i t concerns the actual way in which people from different cultural backgrounds 
think — how can a man who is used only to thinking through concrete situations learn 
to handle concepts, which are the normal vehicles of supposedly 'religious' ideas ? 
The problem^of institutional religion is not one merely of the failure of a 
particular church at a particular time to relate its message, or to preach adequately, to 
the world it serves: neither is i t necessarily concerned with the problem of authority or 
direct association with the secular society. Rather, it concerns the way in which God's 
Truth is first received, then communicated, and then^to a lesser or greater degree, 
enshrined in the credal or dogmatic statements that the religious community hands on 
to successive generations. How does God communicate Himself? How is that 
communication received, and then how is it transmitted to others without losing its 
actual content? 
This leads in turn to the problem of reUgious language. At what stage does 
language cease to convey content, and become after all nothing but a scaffolding within 
which the building has been demolished? This is an issue that relates equally to the 
communication of a divine event to others than those who experienced it, and to the 
'laying up' of a theological truth discovered in history, in some form of credal statement. 
The question here concerns the relationship of the hearer to what is heard, and of the 
speaker to the message being communicated. 
The third problem mentioned above is botii akin to, and separate from 
those already outlined. I f we are talking, very tentatively at this stage, about God's 
self-communication, then there is both a distinction and a relationship between the 
actual communication, and the method by which i t takes place. The problem that 
concerns us here is the different methods of receiving communication that are 
experienced by different groups of people. Without in any way pre-judging the 
relationship between religion and culture, it may be observed on a purely sociological 
level that vast differences in human thought-patterns do exist. What is readily 
comprehended by a philosopher is nonsense to a factory worker: similarly, what may be 
right or trae to a closely-knit group of deprived children, may make no sense at all to a 
group of academically trained students. Now i f content of God's self-communication 
is handed on in a largely conceptual manner, there is clearly a section of any audience 
for whom this supposed conmiunication will hot be communication at all. 
Such then are some of the issues that have brought the question of 
'religion', however we shall finally define it, to the forefront of our attention. We must 
now attempt to outline the manner in which our enquiry will be conducted. 
In considering the concept and criticism of religion in Earth, we shaU have 
to conmience with a brief glance at the life of the man himself, pointing out in 
particular the peculiarity of Earth's position in relation to history. This will apply 
both to the general historical situation of the early twentieth century, and also to Earth's 
relationship to the theological development of the previous century. I t will be 
necessary also to put into perspective some of the technical usages of Earth's own 
theological language. 
We shall then look closely at what Earth actually says about the term 
'Religion*: this will refer us both to his commentary on Romans 7, and also to his 
chapter in the Dogmatics (1.2) entitled 'Revelation as the Abolition and Exaltation 
of Religion*. The text of each will be summarised, discussed and compared. We shall 
then look in particular at the use Earth makes of metaphors to put across his 
concept of religion in the chapter on Romans 7, and also at the relationship between 
Earth's use of the term 'religion', and St Paul's understanding of both Law^ ^^ and Flesh. 
I t will then be necessary to set Earth's discussion in its historical context. 
This will be undertaken by considering first Earth's argument concerning 'The problem 
of Religiori in Theology* - ti:acmg the emeigence of the concept that gives Earth 
his specialised use of the word 'religion', and noting its growing importance with the 
passing of time. We shall then look in particular at the implications for Earth of 
nineteenth century theology from Schleiermacher to Hamack. This will provide a basis 
for a discussion of the significance for our subject of the Earth-Hamack correspondence 
of 1923. 
The next section will attempt to consider flie implications of Eartii's 
methodology. This will involve looking ui particular at his use of the dialectic method. 
Part of this discussion will consider the influence on Earth of S r^en Kierkegaard, and the 
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concept of 'paradox'. The final section of our study will then try to develop the 
meanmg of Earth's concept of 'true religion', looking at its relation to Jesus Christ, to 
thediurch, and then also to the concept of 'unmediacy' particularly as worked out in 
the writings of Martin Euber. A conclusion will then be attempted, to draw out the 
implications of the study to the questions already raised above. 
b) The significance of Earth's early years 
Karl Earth, who was bom in Easel on the 10th May 1886 was not 
unfamiliair with the world of theology from the very start, since his Father, Fritz, was 
himself a professor of New Testament. Eut his own theolo^cal training took him, as 
a student, to Eem, Eerlin, Tubingen and Marburg. These varied situations allowed him to 
study under some of the best known and most influential theologians of his day -
among them both Adolf von Hamack, and Wilhelm He/mann. Of Barfli's dissociation 
from Hamack more will be said later, but suffice it to point out that Hamack was 
undoubtedly the leading exponent of the Ritschlian theology at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. However strong the disagreement was to become. Earth never lost his 
veneration for this great man. Similarly, from Homann he admits to leaming a great 
deal, particularly the need to resist engaging in apologetics, (i) 
The serious doubts, however, as to the value of the Ritsdilian methodology, 
gathered momentum once Earth commenced his pastoral work as an assistant in the 
German speaking church in Geneva, in 1909. The great stress laid on preaching in the 
Reformed Church laid an awesome responsibility on the shoulders of any young 
minister. Earth's problem was how the preacher in the pulpit could in fact do anything 
more than simply speak his own mind, when in fact the congr^tion had come with an 
abnost sacramental expectation of being addressed by God Himself. As he says later 
'As ministers we ought to speak of God. We are human, however, and so cannot speak 
of God ... For to speak of God seriously would mean to speak in the reabn of revelation 
and faith'. (2) 
Two years later, in 1911, Earth moved on to the pastorate of Safenwil, a 
small industrial town in the Aaigau district of Switzerland. He wanted to speak to men, 
men as they are in the midst of their industrialised existence, about God. Grappling 
with the problem forced Earth to look again at the Eible, i i i order to find how to speak 
of God as God and not as a mere projection of mankind. As Heuiz Zahmt puts it 
'He wants to speak to men, to the fabulous contradiction m their lives, but he has to do 
so as a pastor by means of the no less fabulous message of the Eible'. (3) 
(1 i Rumscheidt Revelation and Theology ' C.U.P.1972. p5. and K. Berth Theologize Fragen und Antwqrten 
(1957) p25. 
(2) . . The Word of God and the task of Ministry (1922) published in The Word of God and the Word of Man (E.T.1928) 
pp. 183,186,198. 
(3) Heinz Zahrnt The Question of God (Collins 1969).p.17: 
Throughout this period Earth was aided by the friendship of Eduard 
Thumeysen. Gradually as their relationship deepened, and as they studied together, 
and discussed their common pastoral problem, they began to see the total 
maidequacy of the nmeteenth century theological tradition with which they had 
grown up. With every passing day the gulf that divided an anthropocentric approach 
to theology from a theocentric one became more and more clearly defined. Part of 
this process was also aided by Earth's friendship with Chiistoph Elumhardt. 
Christoph's father, Johann, had renewed an emphasis on the Kingdom of God, in the 
sense of God*s sovereignty over all the world, a sovereignty re-asserted in the 'victory' 
of Jesus over all that kept men bound from a true relationship to God. Eoth father 
and son had strong links with Christian Socialism, and fearlessly spoke out against 
piety, and comfortable religious security. Of them. Earth says he 'felt at home with 
them'. Indeed, in comparing Christoph with Friedrich Naumann, Earth writes 
*Ohe thing stood out even more clearly: that there was contained in the new insight 
(of the Elumhardt's), because of the forgiving redeeming love which included here 
everything human, a comprehensive attack on the bases of present-day society, culture 
and church'. {4) 
That the tradition of nineteenth century theology was totally madequate 
as an expression of the Truth of God was finally and inevocably brought home to 
Earth with the outbreak of the first worid war. Later he said this: 
'One day in early August 1914 stands out in my personal 
memory as a black day. Ninety-three German Intellectuals 
impressed public opinion by their proclamation in. support 
of the war of Wilhehn I I and his counseUors. Among these 
intellectuals I discovered to my horror almost all of my 
theological teachers whom I had greatiy venerated. In 
despair over what this indicated about the signs of the times 
I suddenly realised that I could not any longer follow either 
their ethics and dogmatics or their understanding of die 
Eible and history. For me, at least, nineteenth-century 
theology no longer held any future'. (5) 
This then for Earth was the great expose of the bankruptcy of what was to 
him no more than an anthropocentric theology. His answer was to come five years 
later with the publication of the first edition of Der Romerbrief. In very briefest and 
broadest outUne at this stage, Earth was now convinced that the theology that gained 
a foothold with the Enlightenment, that had grown up in an age that believed in the 
(4) . .The Beginnings of Dialectical Theology (ed. Robinson, Jn Knox Press. 1968) p.42; ' 
(5) The Humanity .of God (Collins 1962) p.14. 
ultimate supremacy of reason and the ultimate power within man to achieve all things, 
and that had matured in the line from Schleiermacher, through Ritschl to Hamack -
that this whole theological tradition was quite unaware of the trae state of man, and 
of the real capacity of the Living God to address man in the living present. What now 
had to be re-asserted was the Sovereignty of God: 
'The theme of the Eible, contrary to the critical and to the 
orthodox exegesis which we had inherited, certainly could not 
be man's religion and religious morality, and certainly not his 
secret divinity. The stone wall that we ran up against was that 
the theme of the Bible is the deity of God, more exactly of 
God'sdeity . . . ' (6) 
I t is perhaps important at this stage to notice also the crisis into which the 
first world war had thrown the whole of European culture and civilisiation. The latter 
part of the nineteenth century had without doubt been an age of unbounded and 
unparalleled optimism throughout Europe as a whole. Of particular significance had 
been the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, which, as it gamed acceptance, 
brought with it an mcreased sense of the power of man to achieve his own salvation, 
given the time and the circumstances. Further the advance in scientific and 
technical knowledge only served as living evidence to man's ability to do ai^]^lieved 
he could. The march was onward to Utopia, to the realisation of heaven on earth. 
Eut the shattering thunder of war destroyed every one of these dreams. I t 
is impossible to overstress the effect of the shock-waves of the war years. I t is hot 
surprising therefore that the publication of Der Rdmeibrief caused such a stir in the 
German theological world. That world, by virtue of its very nature, may have survived 
the shock of war rather better than say the world of art, but this led all the more to 
Der Romerbrief exploding like a bombshell (as Karl Adam called it). I t s publication 
was not unlike in manner, though greater in impact, to that of T.S. Eliot's 'The Waste 
Land' three years later. We are dealing with an expose of a shattered dream, and the 
offering of a radical altemative. Earth himself, therefore, stands at the watershed of 
two ages, and is therefore in a key position to make a significant breakthrough in 
theological method. History has shown that to be an understatement of his 
achievement. 
That Earth's thinking was bom out of real problems in real situations is 
witnessed to by the movement and development within his general position. Not only 
did he all but completely re-write Der Romerbrief only a short while after its first 
publication, but the prolific nature of the successive volumes of the Church Dogmatics, 
(6) Ibid Bl«1. 
and many of his shorter writings in later life show him again and again re-stating his 
position from a series oif different standpoints. Indeed this becomes a part of his 
actual methodology, to look at a particular question, for example the doctrine of the 
Word, and approach it from a variety of different angles, leaving the reader with a 
clear indication not just of the parts, but also of the whole. Indeed the subtie inter-
relation of Eiblical exposition and theological discourse in the Dogmatics are part of 
a deliberate policy. Hartwell says of Earth's method of exposition, that 'it is similar 
to that of a pointiUiste, that is, a painter who obtains his effects of light and 
atmosphere by small dots or pomts of pure colour, which, viewed at a distance, are 
blended into a unity by the eye'. (7) Hartwell further points out one of the major 
problems facing any student of an aspect of Earth's theology, that ' i f we want to do 
justice to the one or otiier aspect of Earth's theology, we shall have to take into 
account all other aspects as well, seemg the aspect m question in the light of his 
whole teaching', m 
In the light of this i t seems necessary to outline, in the brief- est way 
possible, some of the main structures of Earth's theology both to throw light upon the 
particular question of religion, and also to act as a clarification of terminology. 
c) Some outline stmctures for Earth's Theology: 
Earth owes much of his detailed thinking about Theology to the method 
of St. Anselm of Canterbury. Earth's Fides Quaerens Intellectum may not be entirely 
fair to the Proslogioii, but it does use the same general approach, and this is of 
fundamental significance. Theology is essentially an 'after-thinking' of faith: it pre-
supposes faith, and thinks through after the confession of the Church. I t asks the 
nature of the Trath believed, but asks in faith, not doubt. And there can be no finality 
in theological statements, since only God can fully comprehend Himself. Because of 
this, theology can never be complete, since its statements can always be better 
expressed, and better understood. I t is not a form of free thinking, since it is bound 
to the experience of faith, and depends upon Scripture as its source and director. 
Theology, like Anselm's whole enquiry, in the context of a relationship of response, 
and at the same time a gift of God. Because of this basic approach, it is not hard to 
see the extent of the revolution in his thought: he cuts himself off at once from 
Hamack and his other teachers, and starts to re-examuie protestantism from quite 
a different standpoint. 
I f <God cannot be understood except by faith, and i f the human mind 
cannot of itself even so much as imagine the trae existence of God, then it must be 
(7) Hartwell - The teaching of Karl Barth on the doctrine of the.lmago Dei in The Presbyter, Vol5 . No.4. 
(1947) p.13. 
(8) . . Hartwell: The Theology of Karl Barth Duckworth 1964 p.17. 
that i f man is to know God, God reveals Hunself to men. This is one of the most 
cradal ideas in Earth's thinking, that God speaks, acts and reveals himself to men. This 
revelation of God is mediated in human form m Jesus Christ, the one Word of God. 
All revelation from God to men is ui Jesus Christ. I t has taken place once antecedentiy 
in creation, once historically in the 'years of revelation*, and it still does take place 
through the relationship between Christ and his Church. As Mackintosh points out 
'the knowledge of Grace in fact destroys the idea of an indirect revelation in nature, 
history, or m the consciousness of our own existence*. (9) So the trae revelation of 
God involves Him in descending, in bending Himself to our depths. Thus for Earth 
the concept of Revelation is instrinsically bound up with Creation, Reconciliation 
and Redemption. Thus it is that every act of God is a triune activity, and on this basis 
our faith in God demands faith in the Trinity, though Earth is careful to avoid any 
equation between Trinity' and the number Three'. 
God is, by definition, wholly other, and therefore unknowable. Eut 
because it is part of His Being that He is a God of Revelation, so He can be, and is, 
known through the Word. This 'Word' is for Earth 'primarily and originally that 
which God speaks by and to Himself in eternal hiddenness'. (io) It is cracial that we 
understand the Word not as an afterthought of God, but a part of His essential 
nature; for on this doctrine hangs the whole of Earth's outworking of his theology 
of Grace and Reconciliation. At this point Earth's words have a strikingly modem ring, 
since for him the revelation of the Word, while always within Jesus Christ, is not 
restricted exclusively to the years l -30a.d.: the Word also comes in the proclamation 
by the Church of the revelation in Christ. Further to this it may be noticed that the 
basis of the proclamation by the Church is that revelation of the Word attested to by 
Holy Scripture. Scripture becomes that authoritative witness to past revelation that 
brings to life revelation in the proclaimed situation. When Earth uses the phrase 
The Eible is God's Word* he says it must be seen in the sense that God*s speakuig at 
a particular time to a particular person is God's act. "The Bible therefore becomes 
God's word in this event, and it is to its being in this becommg that the tiny word "is" 
relates'. (ii) 
One of Earth's primary concerns is to preserve the primacy and total 
Subjecthood of God. For this reason he insists that any revelation of God is a 
reflexion of his Triune nature. In the Incarnation, it is the Triune God who reveals 
Himself: God the Revealer, God tiie Revealed, and God the effecter of die Revelation. 
The content of this revelation is based on what Mackintosh calls 'a love unbeginnmg 
and primordial'. (12) And as Earth hunself says 'In God Himself this Love is the love 
of the Father to the Son, of the Son to the Father. This eternal love within God 
Hunself is the Holy Spirit'. (13) 
(9) Hjn. Mackintosh:.Types of Modern Theology (Nisbet 1937) p378. 
(10) Church. Dogmatics 1:1; p318. T & T CIark 1956 
(11) Ibid p.124. 
(12) : Mackintosh op.cit.p.300. 
(13) KarlBarth Ci«do (1935) p.119. 
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While it is trae for Bartii tiiat 'God might satisfy his Love all by Himself, 
for He is already an object to Himself, and an object traly worthy of love', (i4) yet it 
is because of His essential willingness to bend and humble Himself, that his Love 
moves outward in terms of creation and Grace. Grace, we find, must be the motivation 
not only of Redemption, but also of Creation. And a glance at Earth's concept of 
Nothingness should indicate that to include Creation in a doctrine of Grace by no 
means undermines a doctrine of evil or faU. Nothingness - das Nichtige-is the absolute 
contradiction of existence, and yet is jiist as great a reality as is existence itself. I t 
is couched in the form of a series of paradoxes that we are left to handle as best we 
can. William Nicholls describes i t thus: 'He calls the Nihil 'unreal','an impossible 
possibility'. *Yet he certainly means to affirm the actuality of evil in the strongest 
possible terms", (is) This Nothing, or 'The Nihil' i f we wish to draw out the 
connotation with Nihilism and anihilation (i6) is in effect the 'shadow-side of God's 
existence' - the absence of his Grace and of his creative 'Yes'. Again it is 'that from 
which God separates Himself and in face of which he asserts himself and exerts 
His positive will ' . (i7) Eut it is because man is faced with the possibility of 
Nothingness that God acts in redemption. 
I t is in Redemption that for Barth the ultimate paradox of God becomes 
apparent - 'The question whether in willing to let this happen to Him He has not 
renounced and lost Hunself as God, whether in capitulating to the foUy and • 
wickedness of His creature He has not abdicated^His Deity (as did the Japanese 
Emperor m 1945), whether He can really die and be dead? And it is a matter of the 
answer to this question: that in this humiliation God is supremely God, that inihis 
death He is supremely alive, that He has maintained and revealed His deity in the 
passion of this man as His etemal Son', (is) The atonement therefore becomes part 
affirmation of the deity of God, part revelation that the deity is a humble and 
gracious one, and part reconciliation through total identification with man's state. 
To many of these themes we shall retum later, but it should already be 
apparent that the concept of paradox is visible throughout; so also is the over-riding 
stress by Earth on the Transcendence and Subjecthood of God; and from his 
being a God of Revelation hangs the whole weight of the arguments that we shall 
be considering on the theme 'religion'. 
(14) . Church Dogmatics 1:1. p.158 
M5)i W. Nicholls Systematic and Philosophical Theology (Pelican 1969). p;i36. 
(16) . As Hartwell, Cochrane and Nicholls. 
(17) Church Dogmatics 3:3 p.351 
(18) Ibid 4:1 p246f. 
CHAPTER ONE : AN ANALYSIS OF EARTH'S CONCEPT OF RELIGION 
1. Religion as discussed in Der Rgmerbrief, ch.7. 
Section A - The Frontier of Religion 
Earth's main purpose in the section of his commentary on Romans 7 
entitled 'The Frontier of Religion', is to show reUgion to be the focus, the 
apotheosisj of all human activity, which exposes man to the inner contradiction of 
his existence; God is radically 'on the other side' of the frontier that Umits and 
marks out the human-ness of mankind. 
He begins by stating that Grace is obedience (i) - an obedience that is on 
'the far side' of man's own activity. Grace is that which brings freedom - and it can 
be no co-mcidence that reUgion is raised for discussion under the banner of freedom, 
and is at once set over against the coming of Grace in revelation. Grace comes only 
as miracle, beginning, creation - all from God's activity - and it is the function of 
reUgion to show this to be the case, by exposing the activity of man for what it tmly 
is. 
Religion is seen as man's ultimate activity, seen firstiy as a paraUel to the 
concept of 'Law', and secondly as a natural extension of human passion. Law is the 
possibility of religion: in other words, it is only because of the limitations of our 
humanity that we become creatures under Law, bounded by morality, and so 
exposed to the inner contradiction of religion. Freedom is only encountered beyond 
the humanism of religion. Indeed, religion, like law, is effective only until death, 
and so it represents the very frontier of human activity. So the death of religion 
opens up a new possibiHty of life. 
The great crisis for religion is that it falls within the brackets of sin. (2) For 
as a passion it springs from mortality, and therefore can only produce f raits unto 
death'. Yet not only is religion a passion - it is the highest form of human passion, 
for i t reflects man's claim to immortality, his desire to become as a God; and this 
desire becomes conscious in religion in both experience and event. 
Barth then develops the argument to consider the activity of God beyond 
the frontier of human activity. He discusser the limits of human possibility, and 
then delineates what is the frontier situation. I t is, he says, the freedom of God that 
makes us what we are not. Only the activity of God can release man from reUgioti's 
iniier contradiction. The boundary of human activity is shattered by the 'etemal 
'Moment'of apprehension' that breaks into man's situation. (3) I f we try to describe 
(1) Per Rgmerfarief ET (OUP 1968) p229 
(2) . Ibid p.23«. 
(3) lbidp.237. 
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or observe this activity, we retum again to the world of religion. Indeed Earth uses 
the strongest possible language to make this point: 'What region of human activity 
is so^tudded with ceme^es as is the region of Christian apologetics and dogmatics 
and ethics and sociology?' (4) Christ, as the freedom of God's activity thus becomes 
the end of the law, and the frontier of religion. In this wayflie activity is on the side 
of Grace, not on that of human achievement. 
The Frontier of religion is thus the line of death that separates time from 
eternity, human possibility from divine possibility, and flesh from spuit. The newness 
of the Spirit stands in radical opposition to the finite, human way of religion. (5) (6). 
Section E - The Meaning of Religion 
In his second main section of commentary on Romans 7, Earth begins by 
saying that Grace is the freedom of God by which men are seized. Once again it is 
important to notice that religion is being discussed within the context of the Grace of 
God. We are not dealing with religion in its own right, but only as it is exposed and 
countered in the movement of God's Grace. I t is in religion that the last visible, and 
the first invisible thing confront each other at the frontier. (7) Grace is not religious 
experience; in fact it happens on the other side of the abyss - and the experience of 
i t iis only void and blankness. Grace as grace happens - it is hot experience - and it 
is something in the first instance to be received. 
Earth then asks whether the Law, closely paralleled to religion, can be 
considered synonymous with 'sm'. The answer - 'God forbid!' (8) Religiori is only 
one possibility among possibilities, but sin is totally mescapable, and lies even over 
religion itself. But again the crisis of religion is that it cannot be escaped while life 
lasts, since it iis the ultimate outworking of man's bemg human. It cannot be 
escaped, and yet its problem is that it indicates that God cannot be found within it. 
Religion can only bring us to the place where we must wait for God to confront us. 
Put more simply, man cannot be the centre of his own existence. 
The relationship between law and sin is developed by stating that religion 
makes sin viable as sin. In religion sin becomes observable experience. The reason 
this is so is that the law is spiritual — and without it sin is only recognised as sin 
by God himself. Law thus is the stracture that defines sin for what it really is ui the 
eyes of God. I t is because of this that we may speak of religion as a threat to man. 
I t s distinctiveness is that it threatens man's existence with non-existence; and. Earth 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid p.238. 
(6) . r f Pai.i T i i i i r h Thp Prntpgtant Era (Nishet 19S1) p.192f.'The boundary Is that point when man's 
existence is ultimately threatened. This border is possible because man is not identical with his 'vital spirit. 
(7) Der Romerbrief ied. cit. p.240 
(8) . Ibid. 
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teUs us, the further the tension goes between possibility and impossibility, the 
deeper into religion we travel. 
The relationship between reUgion and sin is now spelt out further by 
Earth. Man's problem is his effort to seize for himself God's own position - and it 
was against this that the prophets cried out. In this way an attempt is made to bring 
reUgioii under the 'Krisis' of God, and the result is that (since reUgion is the height 
of man's activity), reUgioh is seen to place a question mark against the whole realm 
of human culture. What reUgion is therefore doing is to define the Umits of being 
human, since it urges me to deUeate between myself as finite, and the infinite God. 
Thus either way, whether by confrontation or by natural delineation, I cannot avoid 
the ultimate question of God. My inner desire to go to the limits of my human^ss 
pushes me to the edge, to the frontier, and thereby lays bare my sinfubiess with the 
same inevitabiUty that independent action foUowed presumption in the Garden. 
Passion and independence become inter-related, and independence is Sin. ReUgion 
is the border-country, and in it humanity is drawn into confrontation with God. 
In this way 'reUgioii becomes the working capital of sin; it^ s fulcrum'. (9) 
The argument now moves to consider the nature of existence within the 
realm of reUgion. Man Uves within the movement from creation to recreation, and 
only in the context of this movement can he discover the trae meaning of life. (io) 
Eut the coming of law banishes the etemal 'Now' of creation, and eternity is reduced 
to time. AU becomes concrete and indirect. We are then faced with the inevitabiUty 
of death, and yet precisely in the-!No' with which death confronts us, we are faced 
with the possibiUty of discovering God's 'Yes'. What reUgion does, therefore, is to 
take us to the edge of the abyss, since aU our efforts to 'know' take us further and 
further from the possibiUty of relationship with God. (i i) Yet right at the brink, 
at the frontier with ultimate death, we are suddenly exposed to the possibiUty of 
Grace and ultimate life. 
The paraUel between law and reUgion is now drawn out further in two 
ways. Firsfly the law is seen to create sin - i t is the 'occasion' of it. This is because 
law gjveis the impression that time is eternity, and that piety is achievement, which is 
why in a strict sense we may say that reUgion arises out of law. ReUgion becomes a 
necessity in which the power of law over men is demonstrated clearly. And yet, 
secondly, the law is holy; how can this be ? Our answer can only be in the paradox 
of further questions. But somehow reUgion points from humanity to divinity; 
somehow it is the parable of the divine will; by its indu-ectness it bears witness to a 
lost inunediacy. 
(9) Ibid p.248. 
(10) Much of the criticism of Karl Barth as a dualist rests in a misunderstanding of the dynamic involved in 
in this movement. He is surely describing the intei-nal dynamics of a moment of Existenz rather than a 
temporal progression from one pole to another. This distinction has a major effect on how we under-
stand for example his comments above on 'culture'. 
(11) c.f. section below on Dialectical Theology. 
12. 
Because of this, religiori is seen to expose a reluctance ui riien to actually 
live on the edge. Most people are uhwillihg to face the trath of insecurity, of total 
exposure, and risk; few people are prepared to face the risk of the final ambiguity 
that religion exposes - the questionableness of all human possibility. (12) And this 
leads to the final irony of religion, in that God's 'Yes' confronts us in the 'No* by 
which we are imprisoned. Such is the nature of the paradox with which Earth is 
straggling. What happens is that the only way open to us to avoid anxiety is to 
'obey the law* - which has already shown us that i t can offer no escape. In this way 
the anxiety is increased still further, and once again we are at the frontier tightiy 
encircled by no other thing than the freedom of God himself. (i3) 
Section C - The reality of Religion 
The third sectiori of commentary on Romans 7 in Der Romerbrief opens, 
as have the other two, with the affirmation of an aspect of God*s activity - here the 
Divine Mercy is seen to act In spite o f sin. For sin celebrates its triumph in religiori. 
Religion states that there is no solution to the riddle of life, and that it is a misfortune 
to be borne by all, eithier knowingly or covertly. 
The question of the law is taken up again, and its buUt-in tension-is . 
disclosed, since it is in fact spirituial. Man's problem is that he moves from Spirit to 
death. His potential as Spuit introduces the tension, and the knowledge that the 
law is spiritual is the first requireriient of the religious man. He is called and must 
obey; God appears in his life as a great boundary-wall - with which he must come 
to terms and leam to live. This, Earth, says, is why Paul is a prisorier in chains. 
The tension of the Spirit-world is rendered more acute by the reality of 
sin. Paul is'sold under sin'. Somehow man does not act in accordance with his 
feelings so Earth cannot with Schleiermacher, tolerate right feeling of the 
absolute. (i4) I do not do what I wish to do - this is the inner tensiori of every man, 
and so each statement made is within the ambiguity of needing another to dissolve it. 
There is an abyss between a man and himself. The problem comes when one ego 
questions the other, but is unable to survive its own question: this is the reality of sin, 
the reality of being human, and the very reality that religion exposes in its real light. 
The second requireriient of the religious man is to recognise the extent of 
sin - that there is nothing good in riian as he stands alone, outside the dynamic of 
(12) Der Romerbrief ET p.255 
(13) Use of existential language such as 'ambiguity', 'anxiety', shows the area in which Barth is operating,' 
and this continues to be significant, though less explicitly so, in the section in the.Church Dogmatics 
on Religion (c f. section comparing the two pieces). 
(14) The issue here is not so much to do with 'feeling' as with the possibility of direct or indii-ect knowledge 
of God. c f. section on the Influence of the nineteenth century on Barth. 
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Grace. Even the kingdom of Christ cannot escape the totaUty of Sin. The hoUhess 
and mercy of God have become the personal problem of existence for the traly 
reUgioiis man. He recognises also the conflict between his wiU and his capacity to act -
a further mark of the tension between Spirit and Flesh. AU this is reUgion's witness 
to the extent of Sin. 
There are three things that reUgion exposes to man. (is) First it exposes 
itself as man's great enemy. I t is disruptive, and speUs discord, tension and 
ambiguity. I t exposes man's attempts to build Ulusions as covers for his real insecurity; 
and i t reflects the inner contradiction and questionableness of the human Ego. Secondly, 
it exposes in itself the tension, or dualism, between Spirit and Nature. Like a neatly 
parceUed time-bomb, reUgion wiU eventuaUy shatter man into part-nature and part-
spirit: man is seen to be imprisoned by his own corporeaUty, and this is the ultimate 
tension of his existence. And thirdly, reUgion exposes in itself the problem of death. 
I t points to the paradox that man can neither Uve nor die, and this is his ultimate 
wretchedness - a far cry from the 'conquering-hero' image of mneteenth century man! (i6) 
AU this leads us once again to the activity of God in the face of man's total 
exposure through reUgion. Jesus Christ is the new man; he dissolves the man-of-the-
world; He becomes a man's new real, existential T ; He is what man is not; through Him 
man becomes what he reaUy is. This is the activity of God ui the face of man's reUgion. 
But almost as a postscript. Earth insists that Christ in ho way gives man a new 
independence. Far from it! The original 'am' of wretchedness can never be destroyed, 
since it is bom of law, and the law, we have seen, is spiritual. So ever and again, man 
is thrown back to the edge, to the frontier, by reUgion, where ever and again he is 
'shattered on God', and only then discovers the 'Yes' in the 'No'. 
Within the framework of this chapter it is possible to detect both a 
consistency and a diversity in the use of the word 'religion'. Throughout, it is Earth's 
contention that ReUgioh is an activity that is basic to man being man. This is 
because for him it is the ultimate focus of human existence - it's greatest achievement -
where that focus incorporates a question mark that is eithier faced up to or is covered up. 
This basic meaning comes through in all three sections in this chapter of Der Romerbrief. 
But within this main activity of reUgioh, several secondary activities are going 
on concurrently. I t is the natural and inevitable activity of man to claun and assert his 
uidependence. ReUgioh is also closely identified with the activity of Law, which ui tum 
is seen as somethihg that is spuitual. Again, reUgioh is defined in terms of the ultimate 
human passion - the activity of Deshe taken to its inevitable conclusion. And it is 
also seen as the end^  the boundary, and the frontier of human possibiUty. ReUgion is 
(15) Per Romerbrief ET p366 . . 
(16) , p.269... . . 
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that which exposes sin as sin, due to the tension i t reveals between wil l and capacity. 
And finally i t exposes the totality of man's sinfulness. A l l this is because religion is 
an activity that man wills on himself as part of his own nature: yet i t turns against him, 
and declares him in the end to be an irresolv.'able contradiction. 
Further, as we noted earlier, i t is over against all this that Barth places the 
activity of Grace, that meets man only as he is totally exposed - by Religion - at the 
boundary of his own possibility. Grace is the priority in his thinking, and religion is 
looked at in all the different aspects mentioned above in order to highlight the 
activity of Grace as i t comes to man. 
2. Religion as discussed in Church Dogmatics 1.2 p280-361. 
a) The Problem of Religion in Theology. 
In this section of the Church Dogmatics various aspects of Barth's under-
standing of religion are highlighted, {in Religion is seen first of all as that condition 
of man when the priority of God's Grace is lost or denied. Secondly, the section 
reveals religion to be the ultimate expression of man's anthropocentridty — when he 
seeks both to be the centre of his own universe, and at the same time to be 'like 
God'. And thirdly religion is seen to be that which exists in the absence of, or in 
the place of. Revelation. The problem in history has been reflected in the gradual 
shift in theology f rom the priority of Revelation over religion, to revelation becoming 
subject to the judgement of religion. 
b) Religion as Unbelief. 
Barth's intention in this section is to draw out the contrast between religion 
and revelation, and to show how in the end religioh exposes man to the judgement 
of Revelation.dS) There are two aspects of the doctrine of revelation that throw 
light on the meaning of religioh in this section: firstiy, revelation encounters man on 
the presupposition that all attempts f rom man's side to know or encounter God are 
in themselves doomed to failure. I f man can know God i t is only because God has 
ahready disclosed himself to man. That God is always the initiator of the meeting is 
also the judgement, contamed in revelation, that man without God has a meaningless 
existence. Revelation is thus the 'coming' of 'truth', but in the form of a determinate 
relationship. And yet the truth comes to us as religious men - as we are. I t reaches 
(17) For a fuller analysis of this section see below on the historical background to Barth's criticism 
of religion (Chapter two). 
(18) . . On which compare Barth's treatment of natural theology in Church Dogmatics 2.1'. 
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us in the attempt to know God from our standpoint, and yet i t does not reach us 
in the human activity that corresponds to the revelation; i t encounters us in itself 
alone. The function of religion is to expose to us the impossibility of our own 
attempts leading to communication with the divine. In this sense alone religion is a 
positive thing. (i9) Religibn is unbelief because the divine truth that comes to us m 
revelation is at once replaced by a concept of God 'arbtrarily and wilful ly ' evolved by 
man. I n religion man seeks to be active not passive, and hence is unable to receive, 
and is not open to the gi f t of Grace. Barth reinforces this point by reference to 
Calvin, and to the Old and New Testaments. (20) Particularly from the epistle to the 
Romans, i t is argued that unrighteousness does not refer to profanity or secularism, 
but to loyal worship offered by man to God. And i t is this that is expressed, judged, 
and reconciled in the revelation of Jesus Christ. 
Secondly, revelation is that act by which God reconciles man to Himself in 
Grace. Reconciliation is needed due to man's inability to give up his claim to his own 
autonomy. Revelation contradicts religion since in religion the activities of man -
piety, asceticism etc. - are more crucial than is the object of those activities. This 
attempt to achieve justification through a claim to autonomy expresses itself above 
all in religion; man does not find the justification he seeks through i t , since, Barth 
proclaims, justification is the gi f t of God, found only in Revelation. (21). 
Religion is unbelief in the sense that the law of Grace is revealed in the 
person of Jesus Christ. That justification comes through Jesus Christ rules out the 
possibility of self-justification, and hence exposes still further the bankruptcy of 
religion. Barth draws attention to Luther's distinction between a Godly Man, and 
a Christian, saying that the Christian is distinguished not by what he does, but by 
what God does. Unbelief always suggests man's faith ui himself. This leads to him 
taking the mystery of his responsibility as a human being as his own mystery and 
not as God's mystery. This self-faith is no more nor less than religiori. And i t is for 
this reason that religion must be termed as 'unbelief. (22) 
Barth now moves into a key area of his discussion of the meaning of the 
word religion. For while he maintains that the revelation of God represents the only 
radical challenge to religibn, i t is nonetheless capable of a critical turn against itself, 
that is often misleadmg. Religion is always self-contradictory, yet that contradiction 
is itself a moment of religion. Religion can never give an answer to the ultimate 
question-mark that i t places over its own existence, since its own existence is reflected 
in the question mark itself. (23) I t thus pushes man to the very limit of his own 
(19) c.f. below on comparison between Religion, Law and Flesh. 
(20) . Church Dogmatics 1.2 pp 303-7 
(21) pp 307^ 
(22) pp 310-14 
(23) pp 314-25 
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potential, and exposesit i asv totally inadequate. 
Within itself, Barth goes on, religion is questioned both by mysticism and 
by atheisni. Even in these spheres religion is anthropocentric. The two normal 
modes of religious thinking concern the conception of the deity, and the fulflbnent 
of the law. Both of these are seen to be activities of need-fulfilment. Even the search 
for truth is seen as satisfying-in-itself, which points to its ultimate non-necessity. This 
sense of satisfaction is no more than an extemalisation of what man akeady is. This 
means that religion fiaces the dilemma of always 'going with the times' and therefore 
bemg ineffective, or being permanentiy out of date by formalising a past insight. 
Hence religion is permanenfly sick. I t is this sickness that brings about the internal 
critical turn against itself. The critical turn may make us aware of the falseness of 
the externalised religioh, but i t wi l l not enable us to abandon our inner formless 
conception of God. Only revelation can enable us to see even that as unbelief. So 
our attempts to liberate ourselves from religion will go on, but they too are 
themselves the activities of religion. These attempts wi l l be in the form of either 
mysticism or atheisni, both of which still faU into the category of anthropocentric 
religion. With regard to atheism, Barth concludes *Thus the result of the critical 
turn of religion against itself is simply the founding of a new religion, or perhaps even 
the confimiatioh of the old'. Revelation therefore is seen to be the only radical 
challenge to the concept of religion. (24) 
c) True Religion. 
This section is more fu l ly analysed elsewhere, (25) but a summary of its 
direction regarding the meaning of religion is of value at this point. Once again the 
emphasis is on Grace received being the criterisnby which truth is determined. The 
true Church exists solely in response to Grace, a grace which cannot be dissociated 
f rom the person of Jesus Christ. Thus true religion cannot be seen as anything other 
than radically different f rom the religion described above, and yet i t is intimately 
bound up with what has gone before. I t does indeed take its starting point from 
beyond the frontier at which man's reUgion has abandoned him, but i t also brings 
about the abandonment itself, and i t comes to meet man in his exposure at the 
frontier. True religion contains within i t the dynamic cycle of Grace which includes 
the elements of creatioh, election, redemption and sanctification. 
3. A Comparison of uses of 'Religion' in Romans 7 and the Church Dogmatics 1.2. 
Are then these two pieces of Barth's writing using 'religion' in the same 
(24) Church Dogmatics 1.2 p. 323. 
(25) cf. section on True Religion. 
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way? We may note the context of each in relation to their respective works: the 
chapter in Per Rfimerbrief has the overaU title of 'Freedom' which lies between the 
chapters in the commentary dealing with Grace, and the Spirit. Barth is therefore 
looking essentially at God's activity, and he discusses the problems that man faces 
when he exists outside the spheres of Grace and Freedom. Religion as the height of 
man's activity is the denial of God's freedom sunply in so far as i t is an assertion of 
man's independence - man's idea of freedom - from God. 
In the Church Dogmatics, religion is considered in a remarkably parallel 
context. I t comes m the section entitled *The outpouring of the Holy Spirit', and is 
sandwiched between a discussion of the freedom of Man for God as a result of the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and a section on the 'Life of the Children of God' -
in response to the Word. So, in both works religion, with its negathre and positive 
aspects is placed within the discussion of God's activity towards man. And this of 
course lies at the heart of Barth's entire methodology and inner convictions. 
Within this overaU similarity of approach, we may isolate several common 
strands. Firstiy, in religion man expresses his desu% for independence. In Per 
Romerbrief this is expressed in the context of man being seen as a passionate animal -
his highest passion being to assert his own independence, and to claim for himself 
the position of God. I n religion this passion becomes concrete. In the Church 
Pogmatics this point is made in terms of revelation being seen to become subordinate 
to reason, a fact that in its history the Church has failed either to recognise or to 
counter. Religion is therefore basicaUy anthropocentric, and i t is in total opposition 
to revelation. And in the section on The Abolition of Religion, a similar point is made 
in terms of religion's taking the mystery of man's responsibility as his own mystery, 
and not as God's mystery. 
A second comparison may be made between the parallel activity of religion 
and law in Per Romerbrief, and religion being viewed in the Church Pogmatics as the 
absence of Revelation. The identification of religion with law is not absolute for Barth, 
but he does use the parallel, in the sense that as the law leads to death, so does religion. 
Also the law exposes sin to be sin, just as religion exposes to man the limits of his own 
capacity. And in this sense, as the law is also spiritual (because i t exposes sin to be sin), 
so also the 'reality' of religion is discovered in the 'critical turn' that i t makes against 
itself - which forces man to the frontier, to the Krisis^ and so opens the way for man to 
be encountered by revelation. And so m the Church Pogmatics, religion is seen first 
negatively as the 'absence of revelation', as 'unbelief in fact, - and then because of the 
absence of Revelation i t is seen once again as man's activity, as natural, and therefore as 
moving towards death. Thus the contradiction is apparent between a search for life, 
and the harsh reality that the search itself is an activity of death. Thus the critical turn 
is experienced once again, and the question-mark is placed against all human possibility. 
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This Inner contradiction' is explicit in both the works, and is again apparent 
in the 'boundary' language of the section m 'Der Romerbrief and the discussion of the 
critical turn that religioh makes against itself, m the Church Dogmatics. The unpression 
is that in the Church Dogmatics this is more explicitiy worked out in that the inner 
contradictioh of religibh shows both its own sickness, and also points to the area where 
true religion may he-discovered. This does not mean that Barth in any way allows 
for a 'natural' movement f rom man to God; on the contrary, he is saying that man is 
driven by uiner conti-adictioh to the very edge and frontier of human pbssibility - where 
he encounters the great 'No' of judgement; however, in that very 'No', there lurks the 
hidden 'Yes' of God's freedom and grace. 
This 'Yes' is apparent m both the Church Dogmatics, and Der Romerbrief. 
Ih the former i t is the essence of true religion', and m the. latter of the 'reality of religion'. 
Thus, once due allowance is made between the two works for their differences 
in style, origin and purpose, there is a strong similarity in the treatmeht of the concept 
'religioh* - a similarity that suggests that in the years between the publication of the 
two works, Barth's thinking had indeed systematised, and developed, but there is stiU a 
basic common approach and conclusion. Der Romerbrief was a reactioh to a particular 
crisis; but the true sighificahce for Barth of that crisis lis shown in the way the earlier 
insights lend themselves to such clear and systematic development. 
Having established this similarity in the two works, i t is important to look a 
littie further at the meaning that Barth invests in the word 'religioh'. In the light of the 
factors which led to the writing of Der Romerbrief - particularly the reactioh to the 
theology of the nineteenth century, and the huge culture-shock brought about by the 
first world war - Barth uses religion to embrace everything in Christian History that has 
led away from man's receiving the true revelation of God. In this sense, the nineteenth 
century had been a time during which the emphasis in theology had shifted from the 
'coming' of revelation, to the experience i t brought; from 'speaking' to 'hearing'. This 
leads to the detailed treatment in Chapter 7 of Der Rgmerbrief of the problem of law 
and grace. He makes a close parallel between Paul's use of ' l aw ' and his own use of 
'religioh'. The law was the shackle and the schoolmaster of Judaism, and so also 
religion is the curse as well as the possibility of Christiahity. (26) 
This connectioh between law and religion being apparent, i t suggests a 
historical link with other conflicts in the history of tiieology. There is a parallel at 
least, each in their own context of history, between the law and grace conflict in the 
New Testament; the Augustiniah/Pelagian battle m the early centuries of the faith; 
Luther's oppositioh to the phenomenon of works; and Barth's understanding of the 
(26) c.f. Galatians 3 24-5^ and Der Romerbrief ed.cit; pp 235-7. 
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opposition between religion and revelation. (27) 
In Per Romerbrief particularly. Barth delights in using metaphors to illustrate 
his understanding of religion. Particularly vivid is the description of religion as the 
crater left after the shell has exploded - when i t is revelation that is itself the 
explosion. (28) This has the effect of showing the problem of articulating in human 
terms what is the activity of God. I t is clearly a living, dynamic thing, that happens, 
and all that can be adequately described is what is left afterwards. This same point is 
taken up later when Barth is describing the problem of man being within the confines 
of humanity - 'The V eligjoii that we are able to detect in ourselves and in others is 
that of human possibility, and.as suchjt is a most precarious attempt to imitate the 
flight of a bird'. (29) Once agam, i t is the moment, the movement of tiie divine-human 
encounter, that cannot be quantified or made concrete, without reducing i t from 
revelation to religion. 
Barth develops what he means by the *mbment', thus: ^ i t h reference to 
before and after, the 'Moment' is and remains strange and different; i t neither has its 
roots in the past, nor can i t be transmitted to the future. The 'Moment' does not 
belong in any casual or temporal or lo^caise^mx: i t is always and everywhere whoUy 
new: i t is what God - who only is ihunortal - is and has and does'. (30). 
This 'Moment' has great theological significance. Another metaphor that 
Barth uses helps understand what he means. In talking of the Resurrection as both the 
disclosing, and the discerning, of Jesus as the Christ, he says that 'm the Resurrection 
the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the fleshy but touches i t as 
a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching i t ' . (31) This is the revelation, the 
moment, and also the paradox, since i t is both within time and history, yet in 
neither. Religion, however is bounded by the closedness of the world order, by 
mortality, by continuity, and ultimately, by death. 
Two other metaphors are of interest in this same connection: Barth talks of 
reUgibii as the smoke-screen behind which the activity of God is veiled. This is a 
particularly telling metaphor, since a smoke-screen has a two-fold activity - i t is a 
block that hinders vision of what is happening behind i t , but i t is also that which 
allows a necessary activity to take place. Further, the law, or religion, is seen as like a 
canal bed through which the waters of revelation have ceased to flow. And yet in both 
cases the very existence of the smoke-screen or the canal bed. depends on 
the accompanying activity to give them any meaning or significance at all. 
(27) see below on'Religion and Flesh' 
(28) Barth - Per Romerbrief E.T. p.29. 
(29) Per Rgmerbrief ed.cit. p.184 
(30) Ibid p:i 12 . c f .M Buber, distinction between l-Thou and l - I T , below. 
(31) p.30 (Intro) 
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Finally Barth contrasts religion and revelation by saying that 'Religi6n*^o 
far f rom dissolving men existentially, so far from rolling them out and pressing them 
against the wall, so far f rom overwhelming and transforming them, acts upon them 
like a drug that has been extremely ski l fu l ly administered. Instead of 
counteracting human illusions, i t does no more than intiroduce an alternative 
conditioh of pleasurable emotion'. (32) The concept of religion is flierefore approached 
from many different angles, and is highlighted by graphic description to bring out the 
measure of the problem, and by approaching i t f rom many different positions, Barth 
manages to find a meaningful form in which to discuss what revelation is, in the face 
of the evidence of religion. 
4. The relation between 'Religion' and 'Flesh'. 
I t would be a serious omission were we to neglect the fact fliat so much of 
Barth's concept of religioh is worked out in the context of a commentary on Paul's 
epistle to the Romans. In that epistle, the contrast between 'flesh' and 'Spirit' is 
marked, and Barth uses i t as a springboard for his discussion about religion. We must 
therefore ask what is the relation between Paul's understanding of 'flesh* and Barth's 
concept 'religion*. 
Barth defines flesh - Sarx - as 'unqualified^and finally unqualifiable, world-
liness*; (33) I t is a 'worldliness perceived by men and especially religious men; 
relativity, nothingness, nonsense*. (34) He maintains that the knowledge of sin is in 
fact a human knowledge, common to aU. Indeed, i t is the mark of the religious man to 
know that he is flesh: this is because religion shows him that the spirit is of a different 
order to his natural humanity. There is in reality a . human closed-in-hess, a state of 
bemg limited to a single material order. What Barth means becomes more clearly 
apparent when he refers us back to his comments on Romans 3.20 ('by the deeds of 
the law shall no man living be justified'): of this he says 'what.indeed^does flesh 
mean but the complete inadequacy of the creature when he stands before the 
Creatpr?*'Everything that is unrighteous before God?"Seen from within the sphere of 
human fleshlinessV'the works of the law negate, they do not affirm'. (35) Here flesh 
only becomes recognisable as such when contrasted with the Spirit. This is used as 
further evidence for Paul's argument that the law is in fact spuituial. For without 'Law' 
which is part of the activity of God that exposes flesh as fleshy the 'flesh' retains its 
pretence of uidependence and autonomous life. Thus Bartl^ goes on to add 'what men 
account as righteous and valuable is as such 'flesh' wkidvin God's sight is unrighteous 
and valueless'; (36) The overall dr i f t of Barth's understandmg of 'flesh* m Romans 
is therefore one of total.worldliness, coupled with complete inadequacy before the creator. 
(32) Ibid p.236 
(33) Romans 7.16. Der Romerbrief edcit p263. 
(34) Ibid 
(35) ' p.8g. 
(36) Ibid. 
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I t is important to recall at this pouit in our discussion the fact that Barth's 
understanding of the Spirit, and of Revelation, is very much a moment by moment 
'coming' of the life of God to man in the living present. Failure to bear this ui mind 
would lead us to see Barth as developing a strong form of dualism. To use a not 
un-Barthiah metaphor, he would prefer us to see the spirit as the spark that ignites 
the petrol and air in the cylinder, rather than as the petrol-vapour itself that has to 
mix with the air. And again the coming of revelation, grace or spirit is part of a dynamic 
relation of gif t and response, and not something that is static or tied to a time-
sequence. 
Barth takes the discussion of 'flesh' a stage further in his study of the phrase 
'The Word became flesh'. (37) The Incarnation is the crux of the matter. Only through 
i t can the Word unite with the flesh, and that only as i t is willed by God himself. 
Barth's overall concern here is to preserve the utter priority, and overall subject-hood 
of the Word. For, the Word cannot be understood as object, else i t ceases to be the 
Word. (38) The problem with 'flesh* is that i t claims subjecthood for itself, whereas 
in truth even 'flesh' itself has to be called into being, and can have no substantial 
existence outside the wi l l bf God. 
Having established this priority Barth then pointis out that the significance 
of 'flesh' in John 1.14 is to indicate that God became true and real man. Of itself, he 
says, Sarx does not imply_a man, a_person, but rather human essence and existence -
what makes a man a man, not an animal; human-ness.humanitas, and so forth. But, 
Barth poinfe out, the New Testament concept goes further than that, beyond merely 
neutral human nature. Sarx implies also the man who is liable to the judgement and 
condemnation of God. I t speaks direcfly of the man whose existence has become 
exposed to death because he has sinned against God (by seeking independent existence 
f rom God). 
Barth is most anxious to express the totality of the Incarnation - and so the 
complete humility of God. Only the complete identity of God with man in the 
Incarnation could have brought about the possibility of reconciliation. Flesh therefore, 
within the formula 'the Word became flesh' carries with i t the notion of unredeemed 
man. And to support this claim that 'flesh' implies fallen man rather than created 
man, Barth quotes H Bezzel, who in the nineteenth century wrote 'Jesu^ becoming 
man had never redeemed us, only His becoming flesh'. (39) 
How far is Barth's understanding of Sarx a realistic one? Professor C.K. 
Barrett, in his commentary on Romans distinguishes two major uses of Sarx in the 
(37) . John 1.14 c.f. Church Pogmatics 1.2 p.132ff for what follows 
(38) For this compare section on relation of Barth and Buber below 
(39) ' Quoted in Church Pogmatics 1 2 p.155 
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Pauline epistles: the first, more easily recognisable, where 'flesh' implies simply 
the physical aspects of human life. The other sense he defines as that 'having a 
darker note of proclivity to sin that affects aU men'. I t is this latter sense that is 
destroyed, in principle, at baptism. (4o). This second understanding would be in 
broad agreement with the concept of 'flesh' as outlined above in Barth's under-
standing. 
I t is useful also in this connection to look at the writings of the 
reformation period, many of which were of semmal unportance to Barth. In his 
commentary on the episfle to the Galatians, Luther, commentuig on Ch 3.3, says 
'Flesh is therefore taken for the very righteousness and wisdom of the flesh, and 
the judgement of reason which seeketh to be justified by the law. Whatsoever 
then is most excellent in man, the same Paul here calleth 'Flesh', to wi t tiie 
highest wisdom of reason, and the righteousness of the law itself. (4i) This would 
suggest something of the idea that Barth has used in Der Romerbrief concerning a 
total worldlmess, and also strikes an uiteresting chord with Barth's use of the 
'ultimate possibility' concept, in relation to religion. Ih both cases man's ultimate 
achievements turn against himself, and reveal his bankruptcy without the coming of 
God. 
Perhaps even more significant is Luther commenting on Galatians 4.23: 
here he states that the ctuld bom of the flesh is the one bom at the instigation of man 
alone, without the Word having been spoken. The promise precedes the child of 
the Spirit, but not that of the flesh. This again is reflected in Barth's phrase 'total 
worldliness'- where the life of the spirit has no place at all. 
Two other references in Luther's commentary are worthy of our attention: 
the first is his comment on 2.20 - 'and that which I now live in the flesh, I live by 
faith in the Son of God' - on which Luther says : 'As i f he should say: tme i t is 
that I live m the flesh, yet this l ife, whatsoever i t is, I esteem as no life ...' (42) By 
this i t iis suggested that the life of the flesh, while i t contuiiies, must not be or 
become, the area of dependence, or the fulcrum of existence - and again we recall 
Barth's saying that 'flesh' indicates the inadequacy of the creature before the 
Creator. 
The second passage conies in commenting on Galatians 5.16-17, 
concemmg 'the lusts of the flesh'. Here Luther writes ' i t is plam that he speaks... 
of the whole dominion (universa politia) of sin ... which strives against the dominion 
of the spirit'. This dearly Imks the world of flesh with the reality of sin, and also 
radically opposes i t to the world of Spirit. Here agam one cannot help hearing the 
(40) O.K. Barrett Epistle to the Romans p.146 f f . 
(41) . Luther : Commentary on Galatians Edinburgh 1953 p212 • 
(42) Ibid p.172. 
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echoes of Luther in Barth's very fundamental stress on the coming of the Word right into 
the world of Sarx, and of man being bound until the reconciling Word is spoken. 
We find a not too dissimilar understanding of 'flesh' in Calvin, who, 
conmienting on Romans 7.18, says 'flesh uicludes all that human nature is, everything 
in man, except the sanctification of the Spirit'. (43) 'Flesh' here seems to unply the 
whole o f man's being, not simply the physical limitations of humanity. But Calvin 
adds in the same paragraph, that 'flesh' can apply equaUy to the unredeemed part of 
the soul. I n the same manner by Spirit he means that part of the Soul which the Spirit 
o f God has so reformed that God's image shines forth in i t ' . (44). The over-riding 
emphasis, here, then Jls the contrast between flesh and Spirit, the one being indicative 
of the activity of man alone, tiie other of the life of God. The links wit i i Barth's 
theological outiook are clear. 
We must now consider the relationship between flesh and religion. Religion 
has been referred to by Barth as being 'basic to man's being man' : 'flesh' is termed as 
the totality of lost humanity, as i t is here and now. Religion is 'the frontier and 
boundary' of human possibility: 'flesh' is the state of 'unqualified worldliness'. Religion 
is the assertion of human independence, the seizing of responsibility for selfhood: 
'flesh' is the inadequacy of the creature before the creator - man's value as 'flesh' 
is valueless as such before God. Religion exposes sin as sin: *flesh' refers to the man 
who is liable to the judgement of God, the man whose existence has become one 
exposed to death because of sin against God. 
The similarity in ideas in the above phrases is readily apparent, but they do 
not imply a direct relation of identity between the two words. 'Flesh' is primarily an 
ontological word, indicating a state of being. Religion on the other hand represents a 
fundamentally human activity. I t might be true to say that for Bartii religion is the 
activity of the flesh, but even that is not an adequate distinction. For we have seen 
already that for Barth there is a strong link between religion and Paul's concept of 
'law'. And law in a particular sense, is also Spiritual. So, where religion, because of 
the critical turn i t makes against itself by its very nature, exposes sin to be sin, i t 
too is spiritual. Barth has said that the man of law walks along the very edge of the 
chasm between 'spirit' and 'flesh' - and so religion, too, in its own particular language, 
is the front ier ' between Spirit and Flesh. For the Spirit-world is the world into which 
the Word has been, and always wil l be, spoken into by God, releasing the flesh from 
i t s life-denying orbit around its own centime. 
This distinction being made, however, i t has become clear that the New 
Testament concepts of 'flesh' and 'spiirit' are indeed central to Barth's understanding 
(43) Calwin: The Epistle to the Romans p 267 (ET. Cath. Tr. Soc. 1849) 
(44) Ibid. 
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of religion. His criticism of religioh is a mark of that concept being bound to the 
concept 'flesh', but his call to 'triie religioh' is likewise the critical pointer to the 
breaking-in of tiie Spirit, through the Word. This dual polarity is at the heart of 
Barth's 'religion'. 
25. 
CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF REUGION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
While the main thrust of Barth's analysis of religioh so far studied has been 
biblical and theological, a major sectioh of his analysis in Church Dogmatics 12 
represents a historical survey of the development of the concept 'religion'. And i t is to 
this historical development that we must now direct our attentioh. 
a) Barth's Understanding of the problem of Religion in Theology. 
One o f the difficulties posed by Barth's consideration of the concept of 
religioh is that he develops for the term a peculiar and distinctive meaning which is 
nowhere bound by a formal definition. We have already noticed its use as a du-ect 
contrast to the concept of revelatioh; (i) as a word of polemic by which to describe 
all that was for Barth negative in the pattern of 19th century theology: as a mark 
of the content of man's human aspiration; and yet in contrast, that also which 
brings man to the very boundaries of human experience and possibility, at which point 
he may only be met by God in His self-revelation. 
There is^however, another aspect to the content uivested ui the word 
religioh, by Barth. I t is certainly present in the points outlined above, but is most 
clearly seen in Barth's tradng of flie concept of religioh f rom the Middle Ages to the 
present day. For here we find Barth not concemed merely with what individuals 
wrote and thought in successh^e generatiohs, but with the very process by which the 
significance carried by the term gathered momentum. (2) This process becomes in 
.itself a living and dynamic parable of the very concept that is being traced. 
Barth's discussion of the meaning o f such New Testament terms as 'law', 
and 'flesh' (3) shows us that his interest is hot simply in the history of the word 
'religibh', but rather m its relative meanuig m different ages. I t does indeed seem 
strange that he does not commence his historical study with the use of the word 
'religioh' in the Bible: for the words Threskeiiand Eusebtaamight have made an 
interesting comparison in that the former contains the idea of fear, and trembling -
which might hint at the frontier to which religion brings man - and the latter is more 
akm to the human activity involved in piety and reverence, which in tum might 
reflect Barth's concept of the human activity that is religioh. (4) 
However, i t is our contention that the reason why this is hot done, has to 
do with Barth's desire to restrict his ai^iument to those terms tiiat most accurately 
(1) See above-Ch.l . 
(2) Barth-Church Dogmatics 1.2 p280ff 
(3) . See above-Ch. 1. (4) Paul's understanding of'law'and'flesh' . 
(4) For these ideas, see below, on the influence of Kierkegaard, and the doctrine of paradox, with its 
attendant implications for the idea of living "at risk", ''at the frontier". 
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express the living signiflcance of the problem that religion poses for him - in whatever 
thought or word form was appropriate to a particular age. This is bf course ful ly in 
keeping with his concept of the presentness of God's revelation, and with his method 
of interpreting the Word as coming both in the 'years of revelation', and also in the 
actual and on-going life of the Church. 
In what terms then, does Barth talk of the 'living significance' of the problem 
of 'Religioh'? The problem manifests itself. Barth tells us, as soon as we take 
seriously the concept of revelation. To the question 'how does God come to man in His 
revelation?' the answer given is that 'both the reality and the possibility of this event 
are the being and action only of God, and especially of God the Holy Spirit'. (5) 
This reflects the whole magnitude of Barth's stress on the transcendence and the 
priority of God over man. The point at issue is whether the conung of God in 
revelation is dependent upon man's existence as a receiving agent - and the answer 
given is a categorical 'no' since man's very existence is a result of the creative wil l of 
God. So he continues 'Not only the objective but also the subjective element in 
revelation, not only its actuality but its potentiality, is the being and action of the 
self-revealing God alone'. (6) 
For Barth, however, the fact remains that this activity of God does encounter 
men* Therefore i t must have some form of manifestation that is evidently human. I t is 
in this area, in the place of the human manifestation of the activity of God that the 
problem of 'religion' for Barth really becomes a problem. But is this manifestation just 
one among many? What is the relation between the Old and New Testaments, and the 
sacred writings of all the other religions? Is the norm to be religibn, by which we may 
judge the content of a particular faith, or is the norm to be God's revelation, by which 
we may judge the degree to which the truth of God may be present in a particular form? 
Barth's reply here is that 'the revelation of God is actually the presence of God, and 
therefore the hiddenness of God in the world of human religion'. (7). The implication 
of this is drawn out by the further statement that.that 'which is divinely unique in 
something which is humanly only singular'. (8) Thus flie revelation of God, whenever 
and wherever i t bccurs, remains as the singular Word of God, as His activity and 
Incarnation, however much hidden its manifestation may be by being also of the 
genus of a human religious phenomenon. 
Barth develops this theme by suggesting that this problem of the relation 
between the revelation of God in a particular form, and the evident parallels of that 
form with other areas of purely human experience, is in fact one of whether or not the 
(5) Church Pogmatics l i p.280 
(6) Ibid 
(7) p.282. 
(8) . Ibid - In other words, what is experienced as human religion may or may not convey genuine 
theological content, depending on whether God's revelation is invested in it by Himself . 
27. 
Church is willing to take itself and its bases seriously. Precisely because of the human 
manifestatioh of God's revelation in terms of human experience, 'the problem of 
religion is sunply a pointed expression of the problem of man ui his encounter and 
communion with God. I t is^therefore^ chance to fall into temptation. Theology 
and the Church and faith are uivited to abandon their theme and object, and to 
become hollow and empty, mere shadows of themselves*. O) 
Barth's thesis now is that modem Protestantism has effectively faOed to take 
itself seriously: i t has been happy to see religion as the problem of theology, not one 
of her problems; i t has used religion as the norm by which to interpret the revelation 
of God, rather than the reverse; i t has seen faith as a form of human piety rather than 
as an act of the judgement and grace of God. (io) Barth says that the historical 
development of the slide into religion and away from faith represents a fasdnating 
puzzle. But i t is more than that, and Barth uses i t , surely intentionally, not only as 
the means of providing a historically valid basis to his argument, but also to illustrate 
the reality of the dangers against which this whole area of his work is directed. We 
are being shown a developing historical pattern, and at the same time bemg wamed 
that this is still the living issue that confronts man in every moment in which the 
revelation of God is being manifested in human history. I t is this two-fold activity 
included in the whole of his methodology which gives such a cutting-edge to what 
he has to say.. 
The initial phase of his historical survey points up the great significance 
for theology of the Renaissance. Unti l the emergence of medieval humanism, the 
concept o f religion was restricted ahnost exclusively within the Christian tradition. 
Thus Aquinas, Barth tells us, can speak both of the general virtue of religio - in a moral 
sense - and also of a spedficaUy monkish religio. But this has no thought of the religio 
being a general thing, of which its Christian manifestatioh is but one. (i i ) . 
Barth then moves to Calvin, and again maintains that he has no concept of 
religion as a general thing: despite man*s being ascribed an inalienable 'semen' of 
religibh, for Calvin this 'recdves content and form only as i t is equated with Christianity, 
i.e. ; dis' i t is taken up into revelation and fashioned by it*. (12) This statement 
Barth bases on a quotation from Calvin's Institutes, in which 'pure and genuuie 
religibh' is described as 'confidence in God coupled with serious fear - fear which both ' 
includes in i t willing reverence and brings along with i t such legitunate worship as is 
prescribed by the law'. (13). 




(1,3) Calvin: Institutes 1.2:2 ET. SCM. 1960 
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Barth argues that up to the end of the seventeenth century the position is 
largely unchanged. He admits that the idea of 'Religion' is increasingly employed, 
but he maintains that i t is always contained within the concept of revelation. While 
niiost of the older orthodox theologians do not treat the subject separately, the two 
early seventeenth century Basel men - Polanus and Wolleb - treat the matter under 
the head of 'ethics', m the light of a discussion on the right interpretation of the 
commandments. Barth is at pains to point out that they do not put i t at the head of 
a system of theological principles. However, Barth points to the first warning sign in 
Wolleb - albeit disguised, and 'rendered innocuous by the context' - in the form of 
a general definition of religion - 'Religion in its usual understanding denotes every 
form of the.: worship of God, more specifically i t denotes the immediate form of worship 
of God, and most specificaUy i t denotes either the intiemal form of the worship of 
God, or both the internal and the external together'. (14) The danger warning here 
seems to be specifically in that Wolleb starts from the general and moves to the 
particular, rather than the reverse. 
A slightly different aspect of this same erosion is evident also in Anton 
Walaeus, who suggests that religibn is recognised as true by the voice of conscience 
and of nature. Barth allows that this point is made in defence of the authenticity 
of Scripture, but he asks how long i t wi l l remain a purely harmless remark within the 
context of the priority of revelation. 
The next pointer along the road to undermining the concept of revelation, 
for Barth, comes in the person of A. Heidan midway through the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Barth suggests that Heidan was in fact trying to bring together 
into one approach the uisights both of Calvin and Pescartes. As a theologian he remains 
firmly within the Calvinistic tradition of revelation, but as a Christian apologist he 
points in the direction of a natural theology. On the one hand he can say 'Cum deum 
cogito, concipio ens perfectissimum, numen potentissimum, sapientissimum\.... (15) 
and 'ex hac notitia dei ortum habet religio' (I6). While this might suggest to us a general 
concept of religion, Barth notes that the counter influence of Calvin quickly suggests 
that i t is improper to deduce f rom this that a right reason is the true basis of primitive 
religioh. The general concept is, as Barth puts i t , 'only an apologetic interlude'. (i7) 
A similar reflection of the growing awareness of the tension between 
religioh and revelation is found in M.F. Wendelin. By 1634 he had placed religio in a 
key place - as the object of theology. Religio becomes the concept at the head of his 
theological system, and God becomes its 'causa efficiens principalis'. (18) However, 
such a high valuation of religio is tempered into some measure of theocentricity, since 
'the method of knowmg and worshipping God is prescribed by God for the well-being 
(14) J. Wolleb - Christ. Theol. Como. 2.4. i.3 (1626) quoted Church Pogmatics 1.2 p.285 
(15) A. Heidan - Corp. Theol. Chr. (1676) L. i.p.12/quoted Church Pogmatics V2 p.286 . 
(16) Ibid p.13 
(17) Church Pogmatics 1.2 p.286 . 
(18) . M. Wendelin: ChriastianaeTheologiae (libxiuo 1634) 1.1. (Amstelodami) quoted Church Pogmatics 1.2 p.286 
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o f men, and the glory of God'. (i9). But Bartii is sceptical as to tiie intention o f this 
remark. He suspects that objective language is bdng used to disguise a subjective 
understanduig of God's revelation. 
Quite how we understand this suggestion of Barth's about the danger of a 
subjective understanding o f revelation, is important. We have aheady seen elsewhere 
that revelatioh for Barth mvolves an encounter between God and man, on the basis 
of God's coming to man. Such an encounter must by its very nature have an element 
of both the objective (it is God who comes) and the subjective (man responds to his 
coming). But in this context Barth's comment on Wendelin's approach must imply 
that the hidden danger yet to be made explidt must refer to the subjectivity tiiat 
would use a purely experiential frame of reference by which to assess the content of 
revelatioh. This is the reversal of priorities that is Barth's fear, and he backs i t up by 
reference to yet another seventeenth century theologian - F. Burmann. Again the 
religio is the 'method of knowing and worshipping God* (20), but now the ratio 
becomes recta ratio, implying that its rightness now comes from a natural justification 
of some form. 
The question of 'Religioh' has clearly now become more than a side-issue, 
but Barth picks out two more theologians to represent the birth of what he calls 
eariy eighteenth-century Neo-Protestantism - the precursor in his view to the whole 
nineteenth century movement. In selecting Salomen van Ti l (1643-1713) and 
J. Franz Buddeus (1667 - 1729) Barth is not only showing the development of the 
argument regarding the gradual emergence of a concept of 'Religion*, but he is 
pinpointing the open and final break with the truth of the Reformation as the 
movement that he refers to as 'so-called ratiohal orthodoxy* (21) - a movement that 
sought to draw together the worlds of divine trath and man*s rational knowledge of 
his environment, and to show that the two need not be in direct conflict. 
For both these two men, dogmatics is now based on the assumption of 
an independent and genuinely 'natural' religion. A 'religio in se spectata' is now the 
presuppositioh of all religiohs; the great reversal has now taken place, and the 
knowledge of God is dependent upon the available resources of a man's reason. As 
Buddeus puts i t 'Ut enim a natura homo habet, quod ratione sit praeditus, ita, quod 
et deum esse et eundem rite colendum agnosdt, non minus naturae ipsi acceptum ferre 
debet' (22); as reason is man's natural mode of understanding, so i t should also include 
whatever he understands of God and his worship. The order of priority is now 
established: first establish the general pattem of religioh, or religious trath, and then fit 
any concept of revelation into that pattem. 
(19) Ibid 
(20) F. Burmann 'SynopsisTheologiae' (1678) 1.2:1 ouoted Church Dogmatics 13 p387 
(21) . Church Dogmatics 13: p388 
(22) J.F. Buddeus Institutions Theologiae dogmaticae variis observationibus illustratae - Lipslae 1724 1:1:3 
quoted Church Dogmatics 12 p288 . 
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But both Buddeus and van Til maintain the need for some concept of 
revelation. It is seen as a necessary supplement to natural religion, and not as its 
precursor. Buddeus maintains that the two are complementary, not ui conflict, 
while van Til says that natural religion shows man the need for reconciliation, and 
its conditions; and it shows the revelation of Oiiistianity to meet those conditions. 
Thus Barth has argued his way skilfully to the pomt at which he can 
begin to develop his modem theory of a concept 'Religion'. The main drive of his 
argument has been to indicate the process by which the reversal of priorities between 
reason and revelation has been achieved. He is careful not to point the finger at 
any one theologian as the master of all the development, since it is part of his 
understanding of the concept 'Religion' that it has built into its own structures 
the seeds of its own destruction. (23) This is further evidence of Barth's method 
of study being itself illustrative of the point he is trying to develop. 
Having established the 'breaking point' in his historical survey, Barth 
then goes on to paint the picture between the mid-seventeenth century, and the 
late nineteenth. In particular he refers to the emergence of the Neologians in the 
middle of the eighteenth century, with the proposition that revelation could not be 
maintained in the face of reason, and that dogma and scripture must therefore be 
subjected to severe criticism under the criteria of the 'notiones' of a 'religio naturalis'. 
But this influence was itself abolished by the emergence of Kantian rationalism, which 
reduced 'religio naturalis' to an 'ethica naturalis' and allowed revelation only as the 
actualising of the powers of moral reason. 
Thereafter the argument is taken into the nineteenth century, at which 
it will be necessary to look separately and in rather more detail in order to see more 
clearly the unmediate background to Barth's own thuiking, and also what was that 
fuller picture of 'Religion' that forced him to turn, not only from his predecessors, 
but also from his own early development and theological understanding. 
(23) See page 15 above. 
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b) The Distinctive Characteristics of Nineteenth Century 
Theology in relation to Barth's Concept of Religion. 
In order fully to understand Barth's concept of religion it is necessary to go 
beyond his tracing of the problem of religion in theology from the Middle Ages 
onwards, and to look rather more closely at some of the developments of the 
nuieteenth century. This ui turn entails looking slightly wider than strictly does the 
excursus ui the Church Dogmatics, (i) to the prevailing influences on theological and 
secular thinking of the time. 
Beyond the limits of the strand of Protestant Theology that it has been 
Barth's concern to study critically, we find the theological scene in general wide 
open to the criticism of those towards the end of the seventeenth century whose 
prime motivation was a sceptical rationalism. David Hume's critique of religion 
delivered a serious blow to the 'conventional' approach to theology of a dis-
spirited form of metaphysics, in which the God of theCopemican Universe was 
unassailably seated in his heaven, and successfully laid bare the inadequacies of its 
foundations. The core of his argument against the 'natural' basis to religion 
concerned the undermining of the 'proofs' for the existence of God. Richard 
Wollheim highUghts Hume's two major points: firstly, 'when we argue from effect 
to cause, we are never entitled to attribute to the cause any property over and above 
those it must have in order to produce the effect'; (2) and second 'the only case in 
which we can validly infer from a particular event to its cause, is where the event 
is one of a series of events which have been observed to be constantly conjoined with 
events similar in kind to the cause'. (3) Since the religious hypothesis depends upon 
such a unique causal situation it must in the end be invalid as a strict argument. (4) 
Hume in his turn 'awoke from his slumbers' Inunanuel Kant, who took 
up the cause of moral theology, producing a form of rationalism that was to have a 
profound effect on the course both of philosophy and of theology from then on. 
With the rise of scientific knowledge and method, it became clear that it was less 
and less possible to apply a strict < objectivity to theological principles, or to 
define theological concepts in any of the same categories as used in science. 
The growth also of rationalism, as much in theology as in literature, 
strengthened the belief in the centrality of man's powers of reason: reason was now 
at the heart of knowledge, and Christian truth could be comprehended and defended 
(1) Church Dogmatics 1.2 pp.284-291 
{2) R. Wollheim. Hume on Religion p.22 Fontana 1963.. 
Si The srgnificance of this point is that the argument of (»use and effect can only be 
logic in relation to the one immediate and visible cause of a given effect. The chain reaction is 
therefore invalid. 
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largely through the application of the power of reason. On this basis reason soon took 
priority over faith as the basis of doctrine: doctrine was now to be assessed on the basis 
of how well it stood up to reason's prosecution. It is at this point that we see again 
the relevance of Barth's tracing of the history of the problem of Religion in theology. 
The great reversal of theological priorities has taken place, and the existence of the 
divine is now subordinated to its comprehension by the rational categories of the 
human mind. 
We are of course now dealing with the tension between reason and 
revelation; a tension between an anthropocentric and a theocentric approach to 
theology; a tension as central to Barth's understanding of religion as it was (for 
different reasons) to Butler's Apologia for Christianity. The latter, entitled 'The 
Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature', 
and published in 1736 set out to prove to the Deists that both Reason and Revelation 
are valid sources of knowledge about the Divine. Reason, he says, points to the 
existence of God, and Revelation to His character. There was for Butler a direct road 
to God, but it is in direct contrast to this that the thinking of Schleiermacher stands 
out, and to him we must now turn our attention. 
Schleiermacher feels obliged to point out that there can be no connection 
between reason and faith; they are of a totally different order from each other, and 
are mutually exclusive. David Jenkins states 'that for Schleiermacher that on which 
religion is based has nothing to do with what gives rise to science and morality'. (5) 
Schleiermacher follows on from the period of the Enlightenment, by 
stressing not so much the capacity of reason, as of self, and especially of feeling. For ScUei&rmoclier, 
'Man's highest task' tt.has'^ , ^ sio shape the Self uito an individual, and so to say, an 
artistically satisfying representation of humanity'. (6) It seems as if the core of 
justification which Schleiermacher falls back on is the correlation of what he thinks 
to what actually exists in reality. There is more than a hint of the Platonic idea of 
the ideal and the absolute, for if he commits himself to saying that he knows something, 
then he is believing that what he thinks does correspond to reality. And this would 
appear to be Schleieimacher's understanding of faith. He talks of Knowledge and Will 
as being the two determining factors that lead either to absurdity or to faith. Feeling 
is what unites knowledge to will, and consequently feeling becomes the lynch-pui of 
his system. By developing this psychological interest m faith and understanding, 
Schleiermacher is echoing the cries of the Romantics, championed especially by Goethe : 
this was in many senses a reaction against rationalism, though as we have seen it also 
(5) D. Jenkins Guide to the Debate about.God. Lutterworth 1965, p.21ff. 
(6) . H.T^jieA'ntelh; T t j p j » at'Ma<(ft.^n THe6(egij FbtHawk iqSt p..<«-». 
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follows out of it with the proverbial swmg of the pendulum. 
Religion, to Schleiermacher, is 'the feeUng of absolute dependence'. (7) With 
this statement we come to the heart of his probliem. On the one hand he is pointing 
to something that is surely of fundamental truth, that the attitude of the religious 
man, and his experience of it, is one of dependence, or more strictly of non-independ-
ence, and of the givehness of life; but on the other hand, even given that dependence, 
the theology of feeling is bound to itself by its ego-centricity, and by the limits of its 
own experience. It rejects the Kantian God of the categorical unperative, yet it talks 
of the God that is the meaning between knowledge and will, the meaning that justifies 
the experience. (8) 
It is not difficult to criticise Schleiermacher on a number of counts: we might 
talk of the ego-centricity of his system; of the lack of personality attributed to the 
Godhead; we might echo those who have felt his theology to be little more than a 
sophisticated version of Pantheism. Indeed many of these critidsms might be justified 
were we to take his theology on its own and set it up as a complete and self-sufficient 
model. But the inadequacies must not be allowed to detract from the importance that 
his work had for the development of theology in the nineteenth century, and also 
from the depth of insight into certain areas of religious experience that represent a 
real step forward. 
However Barth may develop his critique of Schleiermacher, we would do well 
to note first of all that Barth owes much to his recent ancestor, and has more in 
common with him than may at first sight seem apparent. On the one hand we may 
note the significance attached by Schleieimacher to the word 'Gelassenheit' which has 
the meaning of 'yieldedness'; This is central to Schleiermacher's understanding of 
religion as 'absolute dependence', and seems to owe not a little to his own Moravian 
background of personal piety. 'Gelassenheit' in conjunction with the immediacy of 
the concept of dependence at least brings the concept of 'true religion' (as Barth would 
style it) into the living present. Schleiermacher is as concerned as is Barth (which the 
latter happily admits at the end of his critique) to avoid the 'dead-letter' of religion, 
or dogma, and to ensure that the context for 'true religion' is 'dialogue', 'a runnmg 
battle' and 'a living discussion'. (9> 
We must now look carefully at the criticism that Barth levels against 
Schleiermacher, since it is important for us to grasp how Barth saw the problem of 
(7) . SchleiermachersSendschr.:eiben uber seine.Glaubonalohro an Lucke ed. H. Mulert. in Sammtliche 
Werke 1.2 p636 
(8) Schleiermacher maintained that in everyone there is a consciousness of the divine. It is found in the 
interaction of knowledge and will - the area he assigns to 'feeling'. 'Feeling' in this sense amounts to an 
awareness of the beyond, and of man's subordination to it , though the 'beyond' only becomes God in 
the sense of what exists, oris given, within the poles at either side of a vacuum that words cannot define. 
Schleiermacher can only articulate the 'feeling' or the 'religious consciousness', but that does not mean 
he sets himself against that which provokes or initiates the awareness. • 
(9) . Barth, Theology and Church, S.C.IM. London 1962.. p.198-9. 
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religion developing right through history. And we must remember that m criticising 
Schleiermacher Barth is also critidsiiig his own early life and thought, which had 
grown out of a tradition that led directly back to Schleiermadier himself. 
Throughout his criticism of Schleiermacher, Barth's main concern is that 
the absolute 'subjecthood' of God, which was so central to his own thinking, is 
replaced in Schleiermacher by the absolute 'subjecthood' of man. Religion becomes 
the reversal of the divine-human order. The opiening section of his essay on 
Sdileiermacher (io) is entitled The Word and Religion'. The Word is in fact something 
within the human self-consciousness which reaches out to the mfinite m order to uiterpret 
the infinite to the finite. But man's spirit needs to be awakened, and this provides 
the role of the Priest, who 'comes forward to make his own insight an object for the 
contemplation of others, to lead them into the reabn of religion, where he is at.home, 
and so to implant in them his own holy emotions'. Thus from Barth's point of view, 
however much the striving after the infinite is undertaken, the frontier is never 
reached, and the possibility of God actually encountering man in this situation is 
eliminated. What^ ior Barth 'Revelation' through the Word, given form in Christian 
Doctrine based on Scripture i^s for Schleieimacher 'accounts of the Christian religious 
affections set forth in speech'. (ii) 
Barth points out that for Schleiermacher the feeling of absolute dependence 
must be united to the actual consciousness if it u to exist in reality. Therefore the 
feeling of absolute dependence, and a definite state of mind are in the end inextricable. 
And if the feeling of absolute dependence represents a co-existence with God, then 
statements about the self-consciousness actually become statements about God. And 
so Barth comes to the heart of the matter by quoting Schleiermacher, that 'All 
attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special 
in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute 
dependence is to be related to God'. (12). 
It appears that the objection Barth is levellmg at Schleiermacher is hot 
that he thinks there is ho feeling of absolute dependence, and not even that any 
measure of human subjectivity is ipso facto wrong; but rather that in the process of 
uniting the self-consciousness to the divine, Schleierinacher is not allowing an 
independent subjectivity to God, from which position the meeting of God with man 
may take place. It is a reflection of the seminal nature of Schleiermacher's tiiought 
he can on flie one hand himself talk of faifli being bofli 'dialogue' and also 'a Uving 
discussion', but on the other hand can be open to the criticism of Barth that no real 
(10) Ibid p.159. 
(11) : Ibid p'.161.. 
(12) : Section sn Per Christliche Glaube, E.T. Edinburgh 1928. 
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encounter takes place between human and divine:. Barth finds the wrong duection 
of Schleierinacher beginnmg in what he calls the 'principle of the centre'. By this 
he means the constant effort on Schleiermacher's part to resolve a paradox wherever 
one appeared, and to seek the truth of the unifying factor behmd the paradox. The 
ideal position, we are told, always lies in the centre of the contradiction. But for 
Barth, this pomt can never be reached. (13) The fundamental unity that Ues 
behind Schleiermacher's theology is contrasted with the equally fundamental, 
and radical dis-iinity that for Barth separates man from God. Thus Barth sees the 
unity concept as being a clear example of religion, reflecting the gradual movement 
that we have already traced developing out of the Reformation period. 
Barth continues his discussion of Schleiermacher by outlining the latter's 
theologico-sciehtific principles. He maintains that for Schleiermacher, the object of 
theology can only be religion, and never God. This is because Schleiermacher 
declares that God may never be known, but only felt in the Christian Self-consciousness. 
Feeling in its religious sense becomes not simply either an act of knowing, or of doing, 
but rather it becomes a centre that actually transcends both. This centre is the 
state of Absolute Dependence, which represents for Schleiermacher the concept of 
a relationship with God. While it is hard to deny the logic of Barth's criticism of 
Schleierinacher's understanding of religion, one cannot escape the observation 
that Schleiermacher's 'mysterious moment when viewing and feeling unite and are 
discovered to be precisely one thing' ( i4) is not as diametrically opposed at its root 
to Barth's concept of revelation as it clearly is in its flowering. For while the 
coalescence between viewing and feeling clearly are part of man's activity, they 
hint at an activity of response to what is already being shown and offered as 
touch. Barth's distinction between the finite/infinite relation and what he calls 
Schleiermacher's concept of 'uiidifferentiatedness' is of great importance, but it must -
not be allowed to cloud the basic concern of both men in the frontier-situation of the 
'mysterious moment'. This is perhaps borne out by Barth's continuing veneration 
for Schleiermacher, despite the philosophical chasm that finally divides them. 
While Schleiermacher has admitted at least to a measure of a concept of 
revelation (it is that which is creatively the act of individiialisation as opposed to the 
state of being an mdividual)^ Hegel finally abandons any attempt to place the divme 
in any way at all over against the human. Hegel pursued a form of rationalism, quite 
distinct from the romantic thinking of Schleiermacher, and the main thrust of his 
argument was that the Spirit of the Infinite can and does arise witiiin the finite 
(13) . Theology and Church p.165ff. 
(14) lbidp.172 
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consciousness. Unlike: Platonism, the absolute mind is not other than, but is 
rather the essence of all finite minds. Thus God is not other, but man has the 
capacity in his own reason to draw on the reality of the Infinite. What effectively 
is happening is that man and God (or more correctiy the concept of God) have 
merged into one in a process of reciprocal self-knowledge. God becomes God 
only as man brings him into being, and man only becomes man as the infinite 
comes to life in him. This is a march not only along the road to pure humanism, but 
worse, to a doctrine of the individual that must in the end preclude all human and 
divine relational life. For as Brunner has pointed out, as God and man gradually 
merge into one, so man loses his individuality over against his fellows, and the 
Thou' of Relation is lost ui the T of experience, (is) 
However, rationalism was not to be the dominant way of the nineteenth 
century. For we find in Albert Ritschl, bom in Berlin in 1822, a refutation of the 
direction of Hegel's thought, and a retum to some of the more constractive themes 
of Schleiermacher. Ritschl carried forward the mainstream of nineteenth century 
theology that was to issue in the work of Hamack, and so he cannot be overlooked 
in relation to Barth. Ritschl saw that the subjectivism of Schleiermacher was 
insiiffideht to properly be called 'Christian'. It is his contention that we can only 
understand God as He puts himself within our reach, and in this light Ritschl finds 
a real place for Christology. He starts objectively from the 'Gospel', and moves 
then to the 'consciousness': thus the process is one of response, and this represents 
a real advance on Schleiermacher. However, the response is purely within the moral 
sphere - the Kingdom of God is seen as 'not the common exercise of worship but 
organisatioh of humanity through action inspired by love'. (16) 
God thus becomes the moral foundation of the universe, and we might 
see here, m part at least, a reflection of Immanuel Kant. ( i7) 
The great danger of the moral argument concerning God is brought out 
clearly by Mackintosh: Ritschl's 'view of religion as such is utilitarian and 
intramundane. Broadly speaking he argues that religion has emerged as a product 
of the struggle for existence. As he puts it roundly, and in a fashion that seems more 
than half unjust to his own deepest convictiohs, 'religion is the instrument man 
possesses to free himself from the natural conditions of Ufe'. But we must ask, in a 
(15) c.f. Mackintosh op.cit:p.114 
(16) . A . Ritschl.The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation Vol. 3. p.12; E.T. T & T Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1902. 
(17) For Kant, according to his moral argument for the existence of God, duty comes to man in the form of 
a categorical impisrative which is no product either of desire or inclination. The imperative is undeniable 
to human experience, and God is seen as he who draws together the often conflicting areas of virtue 
and happiness. The point is that the existence of the moral life demands a belief in God, rather than the 
reverse, (c.f. Richmond, Faith and Philosphy. Hodder 1966, p.39 f f . ) 
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description of this kind, is there anything that radically distinguishes religion 
from civilisation, which also in its own way is the conquest of nature, the reaUsation 
of man's free sway over the world?' (i8) Barth is no doubt echoing something of 
the same criticisni when he voices his attack on his theological teachers for their 
acceptance of the Kaiser's war poUcy in 1914, (19) which is an attempt to work 
out how Christiah faith acts into, a situation, rather than just responds to it. 
Ritschl is probably most to be remembered for his firm call for the 
removal of metaphysics from theology. This God of moral precepts is to be seen 
in the context of the human figure of Jesus. At least, this iis Ritschl's aim, but one 
suspects that the personality of Jesus, or indeed of the religious subject, is still 
subordinate to the moral precept - love bemg isobted out of personality mto what 
amounts to a non-transcendent metaphysic. What is interesting, however, is his 
attempt to combuie the historical with the moral: Christ is apprehended in believmg 
historical perception. But on the question of moral guilt or sin, the objective 
element seems no longer to be embraced: reconciliation is man's giving up his 
distrust of God, on the evidence of History. This again is in clear contradistinction 
to the bases of Barth's understanding of theology. Ritschl's strength may be in the 
realm of the psychology of religion - witniess his fascinating attempt to relate guilt 
to a kck of trust - but his weakness must lie m the fact that he creates a moral 
system that by its very nature denies the life it was intent on creating. Religion is 
once again limited to the sphere of the human, and the possibiUty of a living 
encounter by the subject God by a similarly unifymg process as that on which 
Schleietmacher was engaged. 
(18) Mackintosh, op.cit: p.148 
(19) Barthj The Humanity of God, Collins 1962, p.14 
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c) Two worlds in collision - the Barth/Hamack Debate. 
Our study in the previous two sections of this chapter of the development 
of the problem of rehgion as seen by Barth has thrown up two key issues, both of which 
are brought to a head by Barth's own theological method. The first of these points 
is his msistence that since the Reformation there has been a gradual but very persistent 
reversal of the priority of God's activity over man's response. Both His Subjecthood, 
and the reality of His revelation have taken second place to man's reason, and to a 
purely anthropocentric world-view. 
The second key issue to have emetged concerns the ultimate conflict between 
a doctrine of Unity, and a doctrine of Paradox. This, we have noticed, emerged 
particularly in the nineteenth century in the persons of Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard. 
The former sought always to find the underlying unity behind every paradox, thus 
opening the way for a genuinely human understanding of the divine: but for the latter, 
the whole force of the divine/human encounter rested on a fundamental disunity between 
the two which demanded a dialectical rather than a synthetic understandmg. 
It was in the light of these issues, and the history of theology out of which 
they arose, that Barth and Hamack came into direct collision. Hamack had been one 
of Barth's theological mentors for several years, and this relationship left Barth 
with a clear and deep understanding of tiie 'Ritschlian' theological method, and 
initially a great respect for it. Ritschl had been greatiy influenced by the works of 
Kant: through the influence of Hermann Lotze he had come.to see that reason was 
quite unable to get to the heart of the eptstemological problem - and that the 
speculative and metaphysical approaches to God were no longer of value. This in turn 
led Ritschl to stress both the moral nature of theology, and also the purely historical 
nature of the human Jesus in whom could be found 'the archetype of moral personal-
ity'. (1) The uniqueness of Jesus' life gave it its significance, since for Ritschl (says 
Richmond) 'Without Christ's life of perfect obedience and faithfubiess the real nature 
of God would have remained obscure and unknown, and men sunk in ignorance, 
unbelief, and sin. The work of Jesus is therefore unique and indispensable'. (2) 
Ritschl was only one among several influences on Hamack that equipped 
him, in Barth's eyes at least, as the leading exponent of the whole nineteenth century 
liberal protestant movement. His deep interest m the historical and literary criticism 
(1) miackintosh : Types of Modern Theology p.162 
(2) . Richmond : Faith and Philosophy p.83. Hodder 1966. 
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of the Bible was another key influence. The aim here was to free the Biblical 
material of its hellenistic accretions and so get back to the purity of the 'historical 
Jesus'. In his major work entitled What is Christianity?, Hamack points out that 
the New Testament material aims to be a stimulant to faith in Jesus, and that this 
is prior to a concept of direct historicity. However, a characteristic picture of the 
historical Jesus is possible, since the Gospels allow us first a plain picture of Jesus' 
teaching both ui relation to its main features and its individual application; second, 
they allow us to see how his life issued in service and vocation; and third they give 
us a description of the impression he made upon his disdples and which they 
transmitted. (3) It was the systematic and scientific approach to biblical scholarship 
that was very close to Hamack's heart, and it was to cause him great difficulty in 
coming to terms with Barth's method as it emerged in Der Romerbrief later on. 
The concept 'Religion' took on for Hamack a very positive value, and this 
added further fuel to the fires of conflict and misunderstanding. Of Christ himself 
Hamack writes : 'He lived in religion, and it was breath to him in the fear of God 
his whole life was absorbed in the relation to God.... yiet he was not a fanatic'.(4) 
Despite its somewhat stilted form in translation, this not only shows the association 
of the word 'religion' in Hamack's mind with the very centre of the Gospel, but it 
also highlights the contempt fliat he held for any kind of excess in religious expression -
so distancing himself still further from the somewhat polemic style of parts of 
Der Rgmerbrief. 
A yet more positive value is placed on the word 'religion' by Hamack; 
it is used to describe the whole life-style of the Christian man, followuig both the 
historical and moral precepts mentioned above. Thus he can say 'Religion is not 
only a state of the heart; it iis a deed as well; it iis faith active in love, and in the 
sanctification of life'. (5) Or again, in more rhetorical style we find him stating 
'Gentiemeh, it iis religion, the love of God and neighbour, which gives life a meaning'. (6) 
Barth had been a student of Hamack in Berlin in 1906. Two years later 
Barth moved to Marburg to study under Hei^ann. It was there that he began to 
question his former teacher's methods and conclusions. Through Hemiann 
Barth was led to reflect deeply on the absolute transcendence of God, and of the 
'autopistia' of faith. For Hennaim faith needed no human sdehce on which to rest 
its case. The metaphysical 'proofs' of God are of no value, since 'a god who is proven 
to exist is of the world, and a god of ti»e world is an idol'. (?) This represented a 




(7) Conference at Aarau, 1908. 
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major shift away from the historical/critical approach to theology of Hamack, and 
it was of crucial significance to the development of Barth's thought. 'Hemiann is 
the one from whom I have teamed something most basic', he writes, 'something 
which, once I foUowed it to its consequences caused hie to see everything in a whoUy 
different way, even to interpret that most basic matter quite differently from hun'. (8) 
Martm Rumscheidt, in his book Revelation and Theology (9) which is a 
masterly appraisal of the Barth/Hamack correspondence of 1923, highhghts what for 
hun are the key factors m Barth's movement away from Hamack. The concept of 
'Autopistia' mentioned above is one, as is the overall mfluence of He^ann. A second 
important point to emerge is that it was Barth's actual involvement in the task of 
preaching, especially to his congregation at Safenwil that made hun come to terms 
with the 'contemporaneity' of the revektion of God. Theology could not be just a 
working out of the moral and ethical precepts of an historically proved divine-human 
figure. Rather the Bible had to be seen as the source of a vitally living theology in 
the present moment. It was from the Blumhardts, Rumscheidt tells us, that Barth gamed 
his understanding of the Uving God. There was a new discovery of the meaning of 
faith, over against ^ ious security' and ecclesiastical 'busy-ness' (io) which enabled 
Barth to write (of the Blumhardts) The unhappy word 'religion' which contains all 
the inflexibility of the 'real' world, this word, with which man, tued of life, turns to 
the distant unknown, was no longer used in Mdttlingen and Boll'. (ii) In the place of 
religion was a new stress on the freedom and sovereignty of God: it is God that takes 
the initiative in drawing near to man. The new direction here was not so much in 
the statement itself, but in the seriousness with which it was taken. 
Rumscheidt is surely right in highlighting the BlumhardtV s^tress on the 
otherness of God, in his radical severance from the human search after him, as that 
which once absorbed the developed by Barth, was the final and total break with the 
theology of Hamack, for whom such bold claims appeared no more than a denial 
of a doctrine eithier of God or of man. ( i2) . 
It was Barth's publication of Der Romerbrief m 1918 that drew out of 
Hamack the claim that Barth was a 'despiser of scientific theology'. However, whether 
he saw this work when it was published, or not uritil two years later, is an open 
question. Rumscheidt concludes that it is most likely that he had not seen the work 
before he heard Barth lecture at the now famous student conference at Aarau in 1920. 
Barth's lecture stunned Hamack. The latter, writing to Eberhard Vischer, stated that 
'the effect of Barth's lecture was just staggering. Not one word, not one sentence, could 
(8) . Die Theologie und die Kirche. p341 (1928, Munich) 
(9) . C.U.P.1972;- " 
(10) Rumscheidt Revelation and Theology CUP .1972 p.7. 
(11) . . Vemangenheit uhd Zukunft, in Moltmann, Anfftnge derOiale :ktischen Theologie. Vol.1. p.44 ET p.41 
(12) Rumscheklt p.10: 
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I have said or thought'. (i3) Such strong words are matched by the extent of the 
turn-about Barth's thinking represented. 
Following Rumscheidt's analysis of the reasons for Hamack's dis-
association from the tiiinkuig behind Barth's speech, it is interesting to note how 
closely the points he emphasises relate to Barth's radical re-definihg of the 
concept 'religion'. Let three quotations illustrate the point: firsfly, Bartii says 
'Our quest for God cannot be due to the influence of theology and the Church, 
for 'theology' and 'church' from the beginnuig of the world have done more ui this 
respect to narcotise than to stimulate'. ( i4) . Secondly, "When we admit our 
knowledge of God, we apparently admit something else besides. When we hold to our 
partiy inside position, we are at the same time apparenfly establishing a position 
partly outside. We set up for ourselves a duality, a dualism. We admit our knowledge 
of God only as an antithesis to other knowledge'. To this we must note 
Rumschddt's comment 'is this some kind of Hegelian dialectics, a metaphysics of 
which theology has mOst recenfly and justifiedly rid itself? Hamack has striven 
endlessly to synthesise the knowledge of the world, of the Universitas litteramm and 
the knowledge of God. What is this duality, this dualism? Is it hot the gnosticism the 
church had anathematised?' (15) How well he articulates the thoughts that must have 
been ranning through Hamack's mind! And then thirdly, he quotes Barth again 
'When we ask the Bible what it has to offer, it answers by putting to us the fact:: of 
'election'. What we call religion and culture may be available to everyone, but the belief, 
simple and comprehensive, which is offered in the Bible, is not available to everyone: 
nor at any time nor in any respect can anyone who will reach out and take it'. (16) 
In the first quotation Barth draws out the difference between the work 
of theology, and God as the object of any theological enquiry. This recalls a comment 
made later by Barth in the Church Dogmatics (i6) 'the problem of religion is 
simply a pointed expression of the problem of man in his encounter and communion 
with God. It is therefore a chance to fall into temptation. Theology and the church 
and faith are invited to iabandon their theme and object and to become hollow and 
empty, and mere shadows of themselves'. But the point here is clearly not intended 
to mean what Hamack thought Barth had in mind at Aarau - that theology is a purely 
speculative activity, without any foundation within the real world. Rather, the 
quotation from the Church Dogmatics would indicate Barth's concem to highlight the 
danger of the word form of theology losing the dynamic of the God-man encounter 
that it is its primary purpose to articulate and explore. Martin Buber makes a similar 
(13) AanesvonZahn-Hamack 'Adolf von Harnack' p.415 Berlin 1936 . 
(14) RumscheKJtp.16. 
(15) p. 1 6 - 1 7 . 
(16) . . Church Dogmatics 1.2 p383 • 
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pomt m his book Eclipse of God, when he writes 'Symbols of God come uito being, 
some which allow themseWes to be fixed m lasting visibility even m earthly material, 
and some which tolerate no other sanctuary than that of the soul. Symbols supple-
ment one another, they merge, they are set before flie community of behevers in 
plastic or theological forms. And God, so we may surmise, does not despise all these 
sunilarly and necessarily untrae unages, but rather suffers that one look at Hun 
through them. Yet they always quickly desiie to be more than they are, more than 
signs and pointers towards Him. It finaUy happens ever again that they swell 
themselves up and obstruct the way to Hun, and He removes Hunself from them. 
Then comes round the hour of the philosopher, who rejects both the unage and 
the God which it symbolises*. (i7) 
The point of Barth's remarks about election quoted above make a similar 
point. They are concerned to make it clear that sdentiflc theology cannot m any 
way guarantee, by right of its being scientific, any direct correlation with the 
knowledge of God. The concept of election in this context once again is an attempt 
to preserve m tact for theology, the absolute sovereignty of God. He acts as He wills, 
and reveals himself only as He wills. And this again is why, as we quoted Barth 
above, 'we admit our knowledge of God only as an anti-thesis to other knowledge'. 
Partly because of the conunitment of Hamack to the scientific-theological 
school, and partiy because of the enormity of the reversal that Barth's thinking was 
to entail, Hamack failed completely to see the positive content m Barth's position 
either at Aarau, or in Der Romerbrief. Thus it was that Hamack felt compelled to 
write his open letter containing the fifteen questions to Barth, addressed to 
'the despisers of scientific theology'. In the questions, and the answers given them by 
Barth, we find several further clues to Barth's understan i^lof religion, and also of 
'trae religion'. 
Hamack's first question raises the issue of whether the Bible can be 
properly understood without the use of scieiice and history. Barth's reply is 
important since it ihakes it clear that he is not 'a despiser of scientific theology', but 
that for him the science must only be a tool in the task of understanding the nature 
of God's revelation of Himself to men. Historical criticism can only tell us about the 
God-man relationship, whereas revelation takes place within that relationship. And 
Barth's answer to the second question again stresses that objective knowledge is 
secondary to the faith relationship. With these answers we are right at the heart of 
Barth's concept of tme religion, and again the parallel between his thinking and 
Martin Buber's distinction between the relationships I-Thouand I - I t is of great 
(17) . Buber. Eclipse of God, p.45-6 Harper Torch Books 1957. 
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significance. The 'knowledge' contained in the latter is not wrong or false ui itself, 
but it is only of value insofar as it serves the dynamic relation I-Thou. So it is with 
faith, and objective sdentific knowledge of the Bible. 
Hamack's fourth to seventh questions concem the opposition of the human 
and divine worlds, and they illustrate Hamack's problem in dealing with the 
dialectic method. He was here up against a solid wall of sheer^ incomprehension, and 
as Barth points out in one of his replies to Hamack: 'Is it not pointless and annoying 
to pose further riddles to you now, and more than likely to most of the readers of 
Chrisfliche Welt?' (18) Bartii had clearly recognised flie gulf m tiie mefliod fliat 
divideid him from his former teacher, but Hamack could see only the gnostic and 
other-worldly tendencies of Barth's language when understood outside the milieu in 
which it was concdved. Barth's answer to the seventh question makes two important 
points: first statements about God derived from sdehce or culture may have value 
as expressions of particular experiehces of God, but in themselves they are a far cry 
from statements about God. Mere concepts, in other words, can never in themselves 
contain the revelation of God, which is always a dynamic and relationship-centred 
activity, And secondly, such so-called 'religious' statements may protect against 
atheism, as Hamack suggests, but may also actually sow atheism: this is the potential 
work of religioh as opposed to revelation. Thus what in Hamack's world is the 
theological defence against atheism becomes for Barth that which leads directly to it, 
and that which for Hamack leads to atheisni - the 'otherness' of God in His total 
remoteness from man - is for Barth the very key which allows God to act with saving 
grace towards man. This well illustrates the heart of the Barth-Hamack debate. 
One final thread from the fifteen questions that relates to Barth's 
understanding of religion appears in the fourteenth questioh, in which Hamack has 
asked how Barth can avoid, if he spurns sdentific and critical scholarship, putting a 
purely imaginary Christ at the heart of the Christian faith. Barth replies 'Whoever 
does not yet know (and this applies.to all of us) that we no longer know Christ 
according to the fleshy should let the critical study of the Bible tell him so. The more 
radically he is frightened the better it is for him, and the matter involved. This might 
tum out to be the service that 'historical knowledge' can render to the actual task 
of theology'. (19) This recalls Barth's descriptioh of Religioh in the Church Dogmatics (20) 
as 'unbelief, in which he identifies the critical self-tum that religioh makes against 
itself - which in turn brings man to the frontier of what he here calls 'God-awakened 
faith'. Thus sdentific theology, like religious language, becomes like religibh itself the 
mere crater after the shell has exploded, and the smoke-screen mdicating where the 
activity of God might be encountered. 
(18) . Rumscheidt p.40 
(19) p.35; . 
(20) . Church Dogmatics 1.2 p 297 f f . 
44. 
The debate between the two men is analysed by Rumscheidt fully and 
carefully. It is not necessary for our purpose to trace all of his argument, which goes 
wider than the sphere of our enqmry. However, it is interesting and relevant to note 
the comparison between the description of Hamack's scientific method, and the 
discussion of Barth's objections to scientific theology. (21) Rumscheidt outiuies 
Hamack's method thus : 1) the wisdom of the historian, and his experience of life 
illuminated by study; 2) a systematic study of the sources; 3) a study of the cultural 
and envkohmental factors; 4) the careful identification of the spuit of the epoch 
under scmtiny; 5) an assessment of the meaning of the material for that age; 
6) an assessment of how the positive values of that age can be enhanced now. The 
purpose of the process ^ust be to assist the striving of history itself towards the 
life of the sphit, the life of superiority over matter. This striving is the essence of 
religion'. (22) 
Over against this we find Barth's objections to the scientific method. He 
is not concemed to reject it altogether, but rather to consider its unplications, and 
assess the direction m which it leads its followers. Perhaps in his ihind is Kierkegaard's 
remark which he quotes elsewhere (23) 'Spuit iis the denial of unmediacy. If Christ 
be very God, he must be unknown, for to be known dhectly is the cha?teristic mark 
of an idol'. Barth's fear of the scientific approach on its own is that it will claim for 
itself direct knowledge of God - and that claim is 'religion'. Barth posits four mam 
objectioiis to the method: 1) Reliable knowledge of Christ can only be on the basis 
of a God-awakened faith; 2) Theology and preaching are concemed with the reception 
and transmission of the Word of Christ. This does not so much role out the value 
of scientific theology, as it gives it a new interpretation; 3) Theology is the witness 
to Revelation - 'the gospel is hot a thing, an object, knowledge of which is derived 
m the objectivist manner attempted by the positivists ui science or history. One cannot 
take up a merely analytic attitude to the gospel in the belief that one can understand 
it in this way. Theology is concemed with 'an object which once was subject, and 
which it ihust become again and again' if we are to know it as it really is' (24); 
4) Theology is a science which operates from within its object. 'Its knowledge of the 
object to be known is in fact the presupposition on the basis of which it proceeds to 
* 
ask its relevant questions'. (25) 
The contrasts in the two approaches are readily apparent. In Rumscheidt's 
first point about Hamack the emphasis iis on the wisdom of the historian, whereas for 
Barth the stress falls on the concept of a God-awakened faith. Hamack's method 
then lays great unportance on the historical person of Christ, to the apparent neglect 
(21) Rumscheidt p.105f and 122f. 
(22) p. 106 
(23) . Per Romerbrief (1.16) ET p38. 
(24) Rumscheidt p.123 
(25) Ibid. 
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of the contemporaneity of the revelation of God on which the second of Barth's 
objections rests. Barth's third objection refiects something again at the heart of his 
own thinking - that the revekition of God is a dynamic event, and not a static and 
readily definable concept. There is a dynamic relationship between history and the 
present, between objective fact and subjective experience. It is intieresting to note 
that Hamack is not so far from a similar position when his method is taken as a whole, 
and it is possible that Barth overlooks tiiis in his eagemess to define the areas that 
divide them. But Barth would want to tell us at this point that the dynamic involved 
was not merely the intieraction of the historian's mind with the material before him, 
but is rather the very revelation, the 'coming' of God to man. 
We should note also that Barth's stating of his concem that theology is 
concerned with 'an object which once was subject, and which it must become again 
and again', recalls us again to the insights provided by Martin Buber's categories 
of I-You and I - I t . Buber writes 'The individual You must become an It when 
the event of relation has ran its course. The Individual It can become a You by 
entering into the event of relation''. (26) The parallel between the 'object which once 
was subject' and the 'you' which must become an 'it', stands out as reflecting a 
similar trath, if from within a different tradition. Such thinking would have been 
almost impossible for Hamack to grasp, since it undermined the very objective 
categories on which his theological thinking was based. 
The fourth objection highlighted by Rumscheidt in the correspondence 
concerns the very nature of theology. For Barth, as he illustrates in his Fides 
Quaerens InteKectum, theology is a thinking through in the light of faith, a response 
from within a relationship. For Hamack, as the above method has made clear, 
it was a sdence, and an activity of the human reason. It led to God, rather than 
issued from God. This highlights the gulf between our two protagonists, and 
indicates the conununicatioh problem that existed between their two minds. 
It was for tills reason that Hamack's method represented 'religion', and excluded 
froin it the possibility of the revelation of God. 
It would be wrong to give the impression that we think that Hamack 
was avoiding, by his method, any concept of revelation, or present experience of God. 
This is clearly not the case. Rumscheidt remuids us (27) that Hamack talks of 
'the inner content of etemal matter'. However, Barth is at pains to points out that 
'no mental apprehension of this trath, however subtie, can replace or obscure, the 
real transcendence of this content'. What Barth is doing is to accuse Hamack of 
(26) . . Buberl.and Thou, (Tr Kaufmann) T T Clark p84 
(27) Rumscheidt p.140. 
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identifying the experience with the content itself, and of making what is witnessed 
to co-incide with what is in fact witness. 
This throws up another central d i f f e rence between the two men which 
reflects an aspect of the concept of religion. Rumscheidt concludes (28) ' I t would 
seem to me that here Barth is denying that human historical-cognition can grasp 
God in the human-historical person of Jesus because the very humanity of God is as 
much a matter of faith as is his divinity'. He maintains this to be Barth's meaning, 
since this is scandalous, and yet any attempt to avoid the scandal is to allow direct 
knowledge to replace the paradox. Thus once again the issue is seen to turn upon the 
question of dialectical theology. 
Barth is not trying to sever faith from the human arena, but simply to 
dispute their direct continuity, as Hamack would try to maintain. Hamack's description 
of faith in terms of an inner openness does not do justice for Barth to the other side 
of the coin, to the objective content of what the faith is rooted in. Precisely because 
we cannot speak of God, we are enabled to understand that in the Incarnation God 
is genuinely breajung into the human situation, and he is encountering us. 
Rumscheidt's conclusion of the matter represents a strong defence of the dialectical, 
and more particularly the dialdgical methods, both of which we shall return to later 
ui our study. 
There was a certain inevitability in the non-resolution of flie issues lying 
between Barth and Hamack. The radical differences in their theological ancestors 
meant that neither was really able to do justice to the positive insights of each other. 
But the real value of the debate for our purposes has been to highlight some of the 
issues contained within Barth's concept of religion. But the final issue turns not 
on a particular methodology, or a set of words or concepts by which to define 
an experience or a direction of thought, but rather on whether or not the God-man 
encounter is experienced in the context of a dynamic relationship or merely a 
static observation. 
(28) Rumscheidt p.141. 
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CHAPTER THREE : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BARTH'S 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE CRITIQUE OF RELIGION 
Barth's methodology has always been seen to illustrate the material he is 
discussing. We need to look carefully therefore at the method he uses in discussing 
the concept of Religion, and to highlight some of the influences that are brought to 
bear on his writing, and more particularly, his thinking. This leads us to look first 
at Barth's use of the dialectic method, and then at the influence of Kierkegaard in 
particular. 
a) Barth's Use of the Dialectic Method 
The development of Barth's dialectical method of thinking is closely 
bound up with his reaction against the nineteenth century theology reflected in 
Hamack. But it must not be separated from the more positive influences on the 
early Barth - the theology of the New Testament, Calvin and Kierkegaard. We have 
already noted that Barth was struck with the fact that the Bible spoke, not of man's 
religious direction towards God, but rather of God's self-humiliation in the direction 
of man-kind, (i) This he found to be in complete contradiction to the theology of 
his day. The Bible spoke of the dynamic of God's life, but the problem was how to 
prevent even the words of Scripture from becoming mere words in themselves, and 
not transmitters of the real revelation of God. 
That on the one hand; but on the other, how was Barth to speak to the 
theological world of his day with sufficient clarity to point out the crisis into which 
their thinking had led them? Indeed the word 'crisis' became of special significance 
to Barth, to the extent that *Crisis theology' became an accepted alternative to the 
phrase 'dialectical theology'. The significance of the word 'Crisis' is summarised by 
Richmond under three headings: first as indicating the critical point in an illness -
the sickness of nineteenth century romantic and idealistic theology; second as 
referring to the critical times that this movement had led Christian theology into, as 
witniessed to especially by the ready assent given by so many Christian leaders to the 
Kaiser's war policy in 1914; and third (most significantly) to the judgement (Krisis) 
of God upon all things human, be they moral, philosophical or theological. (21 
But again, how could Barth rightly and properly talk of the judgement of God, without 
his very talking of it reducing it to a mere extension of the human intellectual process 
of self-criticism? 
(1) . H.Hartwell, op.cit. p£ 
(2) .. Dictionary of.Christian Theology Richardson, S.CJVI. 1969 p ^ l 
48. 
I t would appear that we can isolate four problems to which the dialectic 
method emerges for Barth as that which speaks with greatest clarity. Firstly there is the 
question of the maintenance of the total subjecthood of God. For Barth, unless God 
remains always subject, always the initiator, he ceases to be God: and yet God must 
still come to man as an Object of his faith and understanding. Secondly, emeiging 
out of this, just how is it possible for man actually to speak of God not as an object 
only, but also as a subject? Thirdly, the dialectic method speaks to the problem 
of exposing the dynamic nature of faith, as something that happens here and now, 
and as an activity that allows the Revelation of God to continue its activity of 
'becoming'. And fourthlj^there is the problem of how to speak radically to the human 
situation, rather than simply reflecting to it, with its own tools, what it is in the process 
of achieving. 
Barth is compelled to speak of the 'indissoluble subjecthood' of God, in order 
to preserve, or rather to restore, a right direction in the understanding of a doctrine 
of God. In order to 'let God be God', it is necessary to free Him from any sense of 
being bound by human thought forms, or the categories of perceptual knowledge. 
Man can only know God, therefore, because God first knows man, and chooses to 
reveal Himself to him. 'Communion with God means for man, strictly and exclusively, 
communion with Him who reveals Hunself, who is subject in His Revelation, and 
indissolubly Subject at that'. (3) God's Subjecthood is therefore rather of the kind 
that throws a bracket round the objectivity of other things: man is mdeed still his own 
subject, but only in the sense of his also being the object of God's Subjecthood. We 
can always go behind man's subjecthood to see him as the object of God's Subjecthood, 
but behind God's Subjecthood we cannot go. For the doctrine of the Trinity, for 
Barth, unplies that God is both His own Subject and His own Object: He is both 
Subject and Object in relation, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 'and therein lies 
the possibility of the Divine Subject making Hunself Object to man's faith in the life 
of the Holy Spirit in the soul of man'. (4) 
Brown points out that in Barth's stress on the subjecthood of God, he 
includes both a grammatical and an epistemological sense in the word 'Subject'. God 
is Subject: this implies on the one hand that God is the active agent in a particular 
event, and on the other hand that the term 'subject' refers to that pole in the 
subject-object relation that is basic to knowledge of any kind, in which the object is 
inert in the relation of being known, (s) The importance of this distinction is to show 
that while God is the author of the faith by which man can believe in God, the actual 
(3) . Church Donmatics 1.1 p.439 
(4) James Brown : Subject and Object in Modern Theology S.C.IVI. 1955 p.141 
(5) Ibid: pp. 144-45 
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activity of believing is genuinely man's. Thus 'God steps over against the human 
subject as Object in His Word, and makes the human subject capable of access to 
Himself, and able to contemplate and comprehend Himself as Object through His 
Holy Spirit. But it is God in His relation to man, and at the same time in His 
distinction from man, with which real knowledge of God has to do'. (6). The essence of 
the dialectic is apparent in this last quotation. God is indeed utterly distinct from man, 
and yet He is totally committed in relation to man. Man can only know God as He 
becomes aware of the enormous gulf that divides him fi-om God, and recognises that 
he is incapable of doing anything about it. I t is then that the gift of faith becomes 
operative, and God is known in His activity of coming to meet man. I t is fliis accent 
on the total priority, the utter sovereignty of God that marks Bartii out from his 
contemporaries. Here we notice too the significance of tiie term 'crisis' for the 
dialectic method: for the 'Krisis' is the judgement of God, which is expressed in his 
subjecthood by the fact that were i t not for his Creative and redemptive initiative, man 
wouh) fall back from Being into Nothingness. For Barth the essence of man's Beuig 
is that i t is given him by God; man does not possess i t of his own account. This is 
why the dialectic method has often been accused of being entirely negative regarding 
its concept of man, stressuig only the enormity of the gulf between Creator and creature. 
The essence of dialectic, however, in this context, is to indicate that only through this 
radical 'diastasis' can the positive side of God's nature be seen and understood. 
The second problem we indicated concerns the way in which it is possible for 
man to speak of God as Subject. Ever smce the Age of Reason, which effectively began 
with Descartes and ended with Kant, philosophical theology had been concerned with 
God as an Object. The Cartesian epistemological structure of Subject-Object dictated 
that man could only speak of God as an Object, and demanded that He be fitted in to 
the system as a regulator or designer. Richmond points out that Barth's assertion of 
God's subjectivity is particularly relevant as an alternative both to this rationalism, and 
to the criticism made of it by Hume and Kant: fonthese latter two set out to destroy 
the possibility of knowing God in this Objective kind of way. For, ' i f God is Subject, 
tiie denial fliat an Object-God's existence is proveable is urelevant. For Barth God is 
not essentially the existing one; He is always and essentially the coming one; since 
Revelation is an integral part of his Being as such He cannot possibly be the object of 
man's science, intellection or quest'. (7) Given this essential understanding that 
God's Subjecthood involves His coming, the dialectical implication of this again asserts 
that man is incapable of coming to God. In the first place man can only be met by God, 
and be given through His grace the capacity to know God by faith to be objectively 
Subject. So the paradox remains: man can only know God because he cannot know God; 
(6) . Church Dogmatics 2.1 p-8/9. 
(7) James Richmond Faith and Philosophy (Hodder 1966), p.139. 
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man's inability, to know God is dealt with in God's activity of coming to meet man. 
In the third place, the dialectic method seeks to expose the dynamic nature 
of faith. The great danger that faces faith is that it can easily be reduced from faith to 
knowledge. This is another way of saying that it is a very thin line dividing true faith 
as recdved from God, from a reversal of the process that once again makes God merely 
the object of men's knowledge. We have abeady noted that for Barth knowledge of 
God involves His continual coming: this must of its very nature be dynamic and not 
static. God's coming in His Revelation. Gogarten has pointed out, ui his attack on 
Romantic Theology, that Revelation is caught in flie web of the subject-object dUenuna. 
Revelation, to be such, must have God as its Subject, but to be understood by man 
.must also be object, in the sense discussed above. He says the danger for theology is that 
eithier i t makes revelation an object - which it must do - or else it forgets that it has 
done so. I t then beguis to think about what i t has made revelation into, not about the 
revelation itself. ' I t is a confusion, by the way, which infiltrates not only theology, 
but influences everyone who not only relates hunself to revelation ui belief (tiiat is 
allows i t to be the subject), but also thinks about it , makes i t an object. And who then 
does not repeatedly fall from the posture of belief to the posture of thought and 
knowledge?'(8) Oh this pouit Barth would have substantially agreed with Gogarten, and 
it is to this problem that the dialectic method speaks: for i t is in the tension between 
opposites that the truth lies, not in the wholesale assodatiori witii either one pole or the 
other. Only the poles may be articulated, and into the silence in between the Word 
of revelation is spoken. 
Fourthly, the intention of the dialectic method is to enable the theologian 
to speak radically to his contemporary situation. Barth, after the 1914 expose of his 
contemporaries' attitudes to the war situation, was convinced that only God's 
revelation could provide any adequate basis for moral and ethical decisions. The 
direction of the optimism of the age had now become only too plain, and this served 
to sharpen the cleavage between man and God. Again we see the relevance of the 
concept 'krisis* in indicating the bankruptcy of human aspiration when confronted with 
the reality of God Himself. Only a radical 'non sequiter' between man and God 
could enable God to break in, after tiie 'NO' of judgement wifli tiie 'YES' of 
reconciliation and Grace. The problem of ethics is then taken out of the court of 
logical calculus, and is placed the more firmly in the dynamic context of responswe 
obedience. 
We now turn to consider the manner m which the dialectic method conducts 
itself. Barth speaks of the importance of holduig bofli sides of flie dialectic tension 
(8) . The Beginnings of Dialectical Theology Ed. Robinson (Jn Knox press 1968) p.319. 
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together. The positive idea of God must be maintained alongside the critical appraisal 
of all things human!^Both of these relate to flie living truth 'which'bannot be named : 
but'lies between them in the middle and which gives to both the affirmed and the 
negated their meaning and significance'. {»). For Barth this living centre is the oneness 
of God and Man in Jesus Christ. This centre cannot be explained or analysed, but can 
only be witnessed to by a process of affirmation and negation. In fact, 'the true 
dialectician knows that this centre cannot be apprehended or beheld, so fliat he will 
be drawn into giving direct information about i t as little as possible, knowing that all 
such information, be it positive or negative, is not information about it at all, but 
always either dogma or criticism'. (ii) 
At this stage i t becomes clear that the dialectical method owes much to the 
concept of paradox as developed by Kierkegaard. His influence on Barth is of such 
significance that he will be considered separately, but suffice i t for the present to 
indicate that the thrust of paradox, and of dialectic, is to move away from the process 
of direct forms of knowledge, to a process of mystery, of exposure and of encounter. 
And when faced with the question as to how can the ambiguity of the dialectic 
genuinely carry meaning and bear witness, Rumscheidt is right in stating that the 
dialectidah has to admit that he is unable himself to speak meaningfully of the centre 
- 'God speaks not assart of the dialectical process, but when it breaks off. The 
method cannot bring about the event on which it is based and to which it points'. (12) 
Once again we are back in the realm of God's activity in His revelation. 
Two other aspects of the dialectic method must be mentioned. The first 
we have already touched on above - namely Barth's use of the 'No' and the 'Yes'. 
Torrance says that 'only if we insist rigorously that God is not the creature and the 
creature is not God, will i t be possible ui this 'No' really to acknowledge the creature 
as God's own creation, and really to acknowledge God as God, and as the source and 
goal even of the thoughts which man in the darkness of his culture or lack of it is 
wont to form about God, for underneath and above this 'No' that derives from God's 
revelation there is the divine 'Yes' which we hear in the Word of justification'. (i3) 
The central idea therefore is that we can only speak positively about God as we speak 
negatively about man, and further that only as we speak negatively about man,have we 
any hope of being able to speak positively about him also. And so far as the dialectic 
is concerned, it is not valid to speak of either the 'Yes' or the 'No', but only of them 
both together. 
(9) . Barth :.Word of God and.Word of Man. E.T. London 1928 •p.206 
(10) Rumscheidt Revelation and Theology (Cambridge 1972) p.168 
(11) Barth: 1oc.cit.The whole process of dialectic, therefore set out to allow its centre to retain ah existence 
quite independent of, and unrestricted by, the defined opposites by which it is surrounded; where one 
side or the other seeks restraint upon the centre, the centre dissolves, and the dialectic as such ceases to exist. 
(12) Rumscheidt op.cit. p.159. 
(13) T.F. Torrance : Introduction to Barth's Early Theology S.C.M. 1962 p-82 
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The second point is this: Dialectical thuiking may be the method by which we 
can interpret the revelation of God; but i t liever is, and never can be, that revelation 
itself. Part of its own method is to subject itself to the same criticism and questioning 
to which revelation, subjects all things human. ' I f we claim to have too perfect an 
understanding of the Gospel, we at once lose our understanding. In our exposition we 
cannot claim to be wholly right over against others, or we are at once in the wrong'. (i4) 
Dialecticail theology unplies no finality in its statements. I t demands only that they be 
'open* to the truth. In dialectic 'there is a stating of essentiaUy incomplete ideas and 
propositions among which every answer is also again a question*. (15) This capacity of 
the method to lay itself open to questioning by revelation in its very attempt to 
describe i t enables i t to be of particular service in the attempt by theology to speak 
meaningfully of God. The method also acts as a reminder that the task of theology is one 
that takes place within faith, and stands always under the judgement of the Truth i t 
seeks to illumine. 
I t wiU be clearly apparent from what we have said, that the criticism of 
Religion worked out by Barth is firmly set within the dialectical method. The actual 
titie of the chapter in the Giurch Dogmatics on Religion suggests it with the paradox 
of the double sense of 'Aiifhebung', as both the 'abolition' and the 'exaltation' of 
religion by Revelation. (16) The activity of revelation is seen first negatively, and then 
through that negative as also positive. I t is evident also in the critical turn that 
religioh makes against itself by its own inner contradiction of itself; and also in the 
contrast between religioh as unbelief, and the concept of true religion that is based 
solely upon Grace received. And religion driveis man to the frontier and limit of his 
own posability, the frontier at whidi he is met and encountered by God in His 
revelation: and so we have seen above that the Word of revelation comes only when 
the actual method of dialectic has reached the limit of its possibility also; otherwise 
it too, is a facet of that same religjoh that is unbelief. 
(14) . • ., Church Dogmatics 2.1 p.635 
(15) Barth : Theology.and Church, p.299-300 
(16) . c.f. H. Hartwell: The Theology of Karl Barth Duckworth 1964 p.87-8 
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b) The relevance of the thought of Kierkegaard to Barth's 
criticism of Religion. 
In our consideration of Barth's use of the dialectical method in relation to 
his criticisni of religjbh, we noticed the importance of the concept of paradox to 
the dialectical method. The great 'theologican of Paradox' was S r^en Kierkegaard, who 
was bom in Copenhagen in 1813, and undoubtedly had a very considerable influence 
on the development of Barth's theological method. In order to understand Barth, 
therefore, it is necessary to look at Kierkegaard, and to see precisely in what his 
uifluence consisted. 
While i t is true that there is a general connection between the development 
of any great mind and the circumstances in which the thinker finds himself, there is 
undoubtedly a very strong and inseparable bond between the theology of Kierkegaard 
and the very tragic circumstances in which he lived out his existence. The guilty 
secret of his father, only confessed on his death-bed, haunted Kierkegaard, and turned 
hun into a solitaiy penitent. The impact of this confession drove the young man, 
oppressed with an over-riding sense of guilt, to give, as Mackintosh says 'all his 
powers to the defence of Christianity in what he felt to be a vu-tually pagan 
world'. (1) This guilt may have contributed to the breakdown of his engagement to 
Regine Olsen in 1844, which drove him even further into himself in the ensuing 
years, despite his continuing and undying devotion to the lady concerned. The 
tension between love and guilt made Kierkegaard particularly aware of his inner life, 
and i t was through his willingness to battle the issues out that he began to discover new 
meaning and new possibility within the context of suffering. 
This subjective involvement with himself led to his developing a doctrine 
of Truth as Subjectivity. Here personal experience had interacted with a fierce diallusion-
ment with the objecthre rationalism of Hegel. The essence of Christianity concerns a 
deep spiritual inwardness, and this was to form the basis of his devastating attack on the 
so-called 'Piety' of the Danish National Church. Kierkegaard maintains 'that the 
Socratic secret, which must be preserved in Christianity, unless the latter is to be an 
infinite backward step, and which in Christianity receives an mtensification, by means 
of a more profound inwardness which make it infinite, is that the movement of the 
spirit is inward, that the truth is the subject's transformation within himself. (2) 
The point here is the total involvement of the subject in the search for truth. This 
leads to the main tenet that 'only the truth that edifies is truth for thee' - in other 
(1) Mackintosh: Types of Modern Theology, ed.cit. p.222 ' 
(2) . Kierkegaard:.Concluding Unscientific Postscript Ed. Lowrie OUP 1941. p.37 
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words, truth is subjective in the sense that it cannot be known of and for itself 
outside the context of the knowing subject. The purpose of this argument is not to 
maintiain the primacy of individualistic subjectivism that denies real existence to 
the outside world: i t is rather an attempt to state the redundancy of dispassionate 
thinking about God and existence. I t is here that we begin to see the signifiomce 
of Kierkegaard for Barth's thinking about the Word, and about religion. This dis-
passionate calculation that angered Kierkegaard so much was very strongly evident 
in the attitudes of the Danish church; and similarly it was the closed rationalism of 
Hegel's 'system' that appeared so bankrupt to one whose discovery of faith was only 
ui the context of struggle, suffering and total mvobrement. 
A second area of relevance to Barth's theology is Kierkegaard's doctrine 
of the >contemporaneousness of Christ. In Training in Christianity, Kierkegaard, ui 
discussing Jesus as the Inviter' indicates that the uivitatioh is to a way of humility 
that will lead to rejection and suffering: from this Christianity emerges as absolute 
contemporaneousness with Christ. History does not change Him, but He wills to 
change us. This element of contemporaneity is described as the different between 
poetry and reality. 'What really occured (the past) is not (except in a spedal sense, 
that is, in contrast with poetry), the real. I t lacks the determinant of truth (as 
inwardness) and of all religiousness, the "for thee". The past is not reality - for me: 
only the contemporary is reality for me. What thou dost live contemporaneous 
with is reality for thee. And thus every man can only be contemporary for the age 
in which he lives - and then with one thing more: with Christ's life on earth; for 
Christ's life on earth, sacred history, stands alone for itself outside history'. (3) This 
calls to mind Barth's 'years of revelation', and also the basis of his whole doctrine 
of the Word of God. The essence of religioh in this context might be spoken of as a 
lack of the very contemporaneity of Christ about which Kierkegaard is here speaking. 
I f it seems that what we have said of Kierkegaard's doctrine of Subjectivity 
runs completely counter to Barth's doctrine of the absolute Subjecthood of God, 
then we must consider further the place of the Object in Kierk^aard. This will lead to 
a reflection on the meaning and significance of paradox. In the Unscientific Postscript 
Kierk^ard writes 'Faith is subjectivity in its highest exercise, not because it has no 
object, but because its object is the paradox that "the eternal came into being at 
a definite moment in tune, and as an individual man" '. (4) There is a great difference, 
as James Brown points out, between the kind of subjectivity posited by Schellmg in 
which the object is no more than a projection of the subject, and a subjectivity that is 
(3) . Kierkegaard : Training in Christianity E.T. Oxford 1941. p.67 
(4) . Kierkegaard : Concluding Unscientific Postscript pJ512 
55. 
based on the co-relatioii of subject and object as poles in a relationship, a dialectic 
between the perceiving mind and the real world of existence. (5) Here in Kierkegaard 
the Object is sufficiently strong to prevent a 'Nietzsche-like final madness'. But the 
objectivity is not of the order or nature that it can be defined, crystalised or 
direcfly appropriated. To this extent Brown is right to suggest that Kierkegaard 'would 
have repudiated with horror' any suggestion that the Christian view of God, man, 
or the world could be derived from any particular logic or mode of thought. This 
would be merely 'a hew assertion of immanence'. (6) This however does not mean 
the objectivity is totally impotent, or indeed is in any way secondary: 'while faith 
continues to hang on for very life to an objective uncertainty, this uifinite passion 
of subjectivity is yet completely motivated by an object, by something which it did not 
produce, by something which in the end produces the subjectivity'. (7) 
• 
There is here then a real sense of the object engaging the subject; not by 
direct relation, however, but through the tension of paradox. Any attempt to resolve 
the paradox particularly the ultimate paradox of Incarnation, can only be an attempt 
to avoid the issue. Doctrine that exposes and highlights the paradox is good, for it 
then enables the paradox to *become' more readily real to the subject; but where it 
seeks to explain the paradox, i t moves into the realm of direct knowledge, for as 
Barth quotes Kierkegaard 'Spirit is the denial of direct inunediacy. I f Christ be very God, 
he must be unknovm, for to be known directly is the characteristic mark of an idol'. (8) 
Similarly Kierk^aard explauis in the Philosophical Fragments ' I f the contemporary 
generation had left behind them but these words "we have believed that m such and 
such a year God appeared among us in the humble form of a servant, that he lived 
and taught in bur community and finally died", it would be more than enough'. (9) 
We must now consider the nature of paradox as it relates to a doctrine of 
God. Let us consider the argument developed in the Philosophical Fragments, under 
the heading 'the absolute paradox', (io) Kierkegaard starts the section by urging tiiat 
the paradoxical be not despised. Socrates spent a life-time trying to resolve tiie 
paradox of his relatioii to the Monster, Tryphon. So 'one should not tiiink slightuigly 
of the paradoxical, for the paradox is the source of the thinker's passion, and the 
thinker without passion is like a lover without feeling - a paltry mediocrity'. (i i) The 
highest pitch of every passion, however, is to will its own downfall. So reason seeks a 
collision, even though this means its own undoing. So 'the supreme paradox of aU 
thought is to discover somethuig that thought cannot thuik', (i2) - but habit all too 
(6) . IbkJ p.e2. ^ 
(7) LocCit . 
(8) Barth : Epistle to the Romans p.38 . 
(9) Kierkegaard : Philosophical Fragments^ Princeta n 1946 p.87.. 
(10) Ibid p.29 . 
(11) Op Git. p29 
(12) LocCi t . 
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often dulls the senses, and prevents our perceivuig it . 
On the basis of the Socratic doctrine of recollection, man knows what he is. 
Yet his reason in this sense is opposed to his passion, which is still driving towards a 
collisibh. Reason's own passion collides with its own findings and seeks to unsetfle 
it: somehow it brings itself into contact with the unknown. Now if, Kierkegaard 
continues, we call this Unknown 'God', it is folly to go any further. I f God doesn't 
exist. He cannot be proved, and if He does exist, any attempt to prove His existence 
would equally be folly. This, he says, is reasoning, from existence, and never to it. 
To prove that the Unknown is God, is not to prove God, but merely to develop the 
content of the concept 'God' that is based on the presupposition about the unknown. 
Further, between God and His works there must exist an absolute relationship - the 
works of God are such that only God can perform them. But they are seen to be 
visible only in that they do not immediately manifest themselves. This is the major 
presupposition of paradox, and indicates that man can ultimately only work from a 
position of faith. So, says Kierkegaard, as long as I continue to prove God's existence, 
i t will elude me, and His existence will not emerge from the attempt. I t is only when 
I abandon the attempt that suddenly His existence is there again. The paradox is that 
reason only achievies its end when i t ceases to function as reason. 
The passion of reason has brought it into collision with flie unknown; it 
cannot advance, yet neither can it stop itself being occupied with this particular 
problem. Thus the Unknown is the limit to which Reason comes. At this point the 
Unknown becomes the dynamic, the utterly different. God can remain only the 
single idea of difference (c.f. the Infinite Qua^tive Distinction). Yet once again the 
paradox emerges in that of itself the Unknown cannot be a disclosure, since we 
cannot conceive an utter unlikeness. Reason cannot negatively transcend itself. 
Throughout this section we have outlined, the concept of paradox has been 
emeiging, without being specifically defined, suice that.would be contrary to flie 
enture concept at issue. This piece of argument cannot but have influenced Barth in 
his development of the concept of the 'Frontier' and the 'Boundary', which effectively 
represents the pressure-point between the two distinctive elements in the divine-
human paradox. Indeed, that religioh in Barth seeks to thrust man to the frontier 
and at the same time seeks to seize for itself the status that belongs to God alone, is 
already hinted at by Kierkegaard when he says 'Deepest down in the heart of piety 
lurks the mad caprice which knows that it has itself produced a God', (is) And 
further we might usefully make a comparison between Barth's talking of the critical 
self-turn that religion makes agauist itself, and Kierkegaard's continumg in the 
(13 ) Op.Cit.p.36: 
57. 
Philosophical Fragments by saying that Reason brings God as near as possible, and 
yet ^ remains as far away as ever. But reason at last goes astray because it uses 
itself - the like - to empty itself of all but the unlike. I t is trapped by its own 
modus operandi. I t has to learn that God is other, and yet i t cannot learn i t of 
itself. The paradox here is that we need God in order to understand even that we cannot 
understand. 
Kierkegaard then goes on to discuss the paradox in terms of 'the offended 
consciousness': offence is that which occurs when reason is left with an unfulfilled 
love as a result of a non-establishment of a working relationship between reason and 
the paradox. The significant thing is that for Kierkegaard 'Offence' becomes a key-note 
in his doctrine of transcendence. And this in turn may give us some clues as to Barth's 
doctrine of revelation. At root, Kierkegaard says, offence is always passive. Self-love, 
when i t resorts to deeds of daring, is in fact passive and wounded. An active offended 
consciousness could always tear itself from its cross, but a passive one will always 
allow itself to be destroyed. This passive offence cannot derive from the reason, eke it 
would avoid self-destruction, hence it must derive from the paradox. Indeed the 
offended consciousness is understood by the paradox, and in its turn, echoes it. And the 
greater the passion aroused by the offence, the more evident its source in the paradox. 
So, he says, offence 'comes into being' with the paradox. ( i4) . The 'coming into being' 
now takes on a particular significance. I t reflects the moment upon which everything 
depends. 'The moment is the paradox in its most abbreviated form'. (15) I f we once 
posit the moment, then everything else follows, and the offence is seen to represent 
a misunderstanding of the moment. 
The final section of his argument suggests that to reason the paradox is 
absurd, since reason will idways seek to master and control it. But Paradox is also 
Miracle, and this is why reason finally wants.: nothing to do with it. I f reason offers 
to help the paradox, paradox understands why reason does this, but I t decides to 
declare reason a dunce and a blockhead' for trying to 'trivialise' the Supernatural. (16). 
Thus at last the paradox is seen to be the operation of the supernatural, that is 
unintielligible to reason except where it drives reason to the frontier, and meets it 
when reason gives up the attempt. 
For Kierkegaard the Incarnation is the final paradox. And in a sense this is 
true for Barth ako; The latter's doctrine of revelation through tiie 'coming' of the 
'Word' both ui the Incarnation and the present 'moment' echoes much of the drift of 





a clear antecedent in Kierkegaard's claun that it is the offended consciousness that 
seeks to explain and rationalise the Paradox while clauning to have discovered the 
method for itself. I t does not admit either that i t has in fact received its own existence 
from the Paradox, or that it has used what is referred to as the 'acoustic illusion' to 
make bogus claims for itself. The illusion is m fact that the offence is echouig the 
content of the paradox, when all the while it thinks it is engaging in an autonomous 
piece of work. 
It will have become clear that this doctrine of the Paradox that contauis 
a strong sense of the Transcendent, and a clear surrender of the reason to the paradox, 
is worked out in almost direct opposition to the philosophy of Hegel, which was very 
much in vogue at the time Kierkegaard was writing. The possibility of a positive 
advance being made by the positing of a synthesis out^ a conflicting thesis and antithesis 
is ruled out the moment the paradox plants its question mark against the whole process 
of rational thought as a means of understanding God, man, and the world. This is why 
so much of Kierkegaard's life was devoted to violent preaching against the religion of 
his day. Indeed, in his Training in Christianity he writes 'Christendom has done away 
with Christianity, without being quite aware of it. The consequence is that, if anything 
is to be done, one must try again to introduce Christianity into Christendom'. (17) This 
can be seen as one more r^'&on f ^ r the enthusiasm that Barth, especially in his early 
years, showed in the work of Kierkegaard. Theu- two situations were not at all unlike, 
and in view of the general ignorance of Kiericegaard that existed among European 
theologiaiis until Barth's time they might well be seen as part of a similar movemenyand 
radical change of direction. 
For Kierkegaard the offence of the paradox lay at the heart of the matter. 
I t was the offence of Christianity that was being overlooked and indeed systematically 
undermined by the church of his day. The offence of the Incarnation showed itself 
primarily in two Ways : one was the 'loftiness' of the God-Man, the offence being 
that a man should claim to be God; and the other was the offence of 'lowliness' - in 
that God should be wQling to suffer. (IIB ) But the basic possibility of the offence lies 
in the refusal of God to employ direct communication. This is the whole mystery 
of the suffering of Christ, (19) a mystery which the church sought to systematise 
and control. Indeed, 'take away the possibility of offence, as they have done ui 
Christendom, and the whole of Christianity is dhect conununication, and then 
Christianity is done away with, for it has become an easy thuig, a superficial something 
which neiflier wounds nor heals profoundly enough; it is the false invention of human 
sympathy which forgets the infinite quahtative distinction between God and man'. (20) 
(17) Kierkeoaaid: Training in Christianity p.39 




This refusal to empfay direct communication is the basis of Kierkegaard's 
understanding of faith. Faith emerges in trust, when a question-mark is set against the 
person believed in. A direct manifestation would be easy to believe, since it is easily 
grasped, but an indirect one can only be encountered in faith. This agam is a basic 
attitude that we find at the heart of Barth's theology: I t is expressed thus with 
dramatic clarity - 'faith is awe in the presence of the divine incognito' (21) And 
again, 'Unto faith is revealed that which God reveals firom his faithfubiess. To those 
who have abandoned direct conmiunication the communication is made. To those 
willing to venture with God, He speaks. Those who take upon them the divine No 
shall themselves be borne by the greater divine Yes'. (22) 
What we have seen in Kierkegaard is undoubtedly of the greatest 
significance to Barth. We have paid particular attention to the concept of paradox; 
to the objection to direct forms of knowledge of God; to the subject-object relation 
in Kierkegaard; and also the meaning of faith. All of these have seen to be particularly 
relevant to the criticism of Religion worked out by Barth: not only do they provide 
the basis for his attack on the mainstream of nineteenth century theology, but they 
also provide the foundation on which the concept of True Religion can be buUt 
up. (23). 
(21) Barth : Op. Cit. p.39. 
(22) Op. Cit. p. 41. 
(23) For which, see Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : THE WAY FORWARD 
a) Barth's Concept of True Religion 
In the light of the massive criticisms amassed against the concept of Religion 
by Barth, it is hard to envisage how he can happily go on to write a whole section 
entitied 'True Religion'. I t becomes even more paradoxical when it is realised that 
this is not a section tacked on to the end of the criticisms by way of an apology to those 
who might have taken offence, but is rather a fully integrated part of the argument 
that Barth is putting forward. 
Barth sets the scene in his opening remarks in his section entitled True 
Religion': "the preceding expositions have established flie fact that we can only speak 
of 'true' religion in the sense in which we speak of a 'justified sinner*". (i) And just 
as the smher's justification is questionable as soon as it is claimed as by right, so too 
the Christian Religion, as soon as it ceases to be in its very self forgiven, 'stands under 
the judgement that religion is unbelief, and that i t is not acquitted by any inward 
worthiness, but only by the grace of God, proclauned and effectual in his revelation'. (2) 
A second key strand that may help to guide our thinking about 'true religion' 
is to consider the importance of the word 'true'. Barth's very precise use of language 
might lead us to detect a coimection between the word 'true' in the sense of 'true 
religion', and the word 'true' as applied to Jesus Christ himself. So 'Theology must 
begin with Jesus Christ, and not with general principles, however better, or at any rate 
more relevant and illuminating they may appear to be: as though he were a continuation 
of the knowledge and Word of God, and not its root and origin, not indeed the very 
Word of God itself. (3) In the German flie connection between 'very' and 'true' 
is more clearly visible than m the English. And again, the link is made with Jesus 
as the Way the Truth and the Life (Jn 14.6) in a passage that speaks of Jesus Christ as 
the immanent God from whom the Church is to expect everything (4) On this basis 
it might be conjectured that for Barth, the significance of the term 'true'm relation 
to leligibh is precisely that there is no true religioh outside the dynamic of the person 
of Jesus Christ. The filling out of the concept religion by the comuig of Jesus Christ 
is alone what giv^ to the term any valid or true substance. And that substance is 
vitally bound up with the on-gouig redemptive activity of Jesus Christ. 
Let us now consider the movement of Barth's argument as he discusses 
the concept of true religion. (5). No religion, he says, is true ui itself. But a religioh 
(1) . Church Dogmatics 1 i p.325 
(2) Ibid, p.327 
(3) Church Dogmatics 2.2 p.4f. 
(4) 2.1: p;319. 
(5) 1.2: p.325-61. 
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can become true as a result of its becoming a creation of Grace. We may only claim 
truth for the Christian Religion, i f we are prepared to face revel ation's judgement 
upon the claim itself. In the book of Exodus there is a demonstration of the 
judgement of revelation upon the religion of Israel, through Moses, the man of Grace. 
In the New Testament also Peter as Peter is seen as a man condemned, yet the 
disciples, as the disciples of Christ are branches of the true vme - men responding to 
the activity!||brace. Justification is by faith, but faith is not the same as religious 
self-consciousness (and this for Barth is a key distinction between his own thinking 
and that of Schleiermacher) (6) True faith compels a man to think beyond 
self-consciousness. Further, true religion is only possible m faith, as we abandon 
all the securities that we have created for ourselves. Thus Barth reminds us of Paul's 
words 'When I am weak, then am I strong'. (7) But while faith is not to be compared 
with the religious self-consciousness of Schleiermacher, Barth's understanding of the 
need to abandon all securities reflects not a little of the doctrine of absolute 
dependence put forward by Schleiermacher. The distinction** *Hrymg to stress appears 
to relate more to a rejection of the idea of dependence being based on a 'feeling' -
which itself for Barth is another human security — than to the concept of dependence 
in itself. On this point at least, history has drawn an unduly strong line between the 
thinking of these two great men. 
Christianity however, Barth goes on, cannot claim to be true religion unless 
it recognises its own religious self-consciousness to be nothing without the gift of 
grace in its weakness. This clearly underlines the point made in our last paragraph. 
For Barth the great danger of Schleiermacher's methodology was that it leads to a 
rejection of the priority of Grace, which^as we have noted time and again, is at the heart 
of Barth's entire thought. Barth illustrates this danger by highlightmg three periods of 
history. Before Constantine, the early church was a persecuted minority. I t had to 
makeJts way over against the vast mass of paganism throughout tiie Roman Empure, 
and its only resource was the Grace of God. The problem only began to arise as the 
leaders of the church began to make defence of the faith on the basis that it was a 
better religion than its pagan counterparts. The mistake was both to see paganism 
as a counterpart at all, and to fail to see the judgement upon Christianity as a religion 
as much as upon the specifically 'pagan' religions themselves. 
After the recognition of the Church by Constantuie, the church-state 
relationship led swiftiy to the total removal of the priority of Grace, and Christianity 
as a religion among religions was fuUy established. Christianity was seen as better 
in terms of culture, morality, and monotheism - a rich self-consciousness indeed, but 
(6) . 'Faith' for Barth is much more clearly established as a function of the revealing activity of God in Grace. 
The response Itself is a gift of God. For Schleiermacher, however, faith is more man's response to the 
existence within his own tieing to of a God^onsciousness - for which c.iihe discussion of Schleiermacher at p . 
32ff ; 
(7) 2 Corinthians 12.10 
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one that lacked both grace and love. 
Thiidly,Barth identifies the modem period, since the Renaissance, which 
has seen the collapse of the 'Corpus Christiariuni'. Rather the church has become 
'used' by the state, and seen by i t as little more than a tool or a status-symbol. The 
expansion of the church through missionary activity has led more to a confrontation 
of cultures, than to a proclamation of revelation and Grace. 
Barth's conclusion from this somewhat sorry analysis is that the only 
possible context m which i t might be appropriate to speak of Christianity as the 
true religion, is that of a doctrine of forgiveness. (8) But more of that presently. 
Barth continues his argument by statmg that Christianity is the history of the 
contradiction between Grace and religion. (9) 'Biit in the history of Christianity, 
just because i t is the religion of revelation, the sin is, as i t were, committed with a 
high hand. Yes, sin! For contradiction against 3 race is unbelief, and unbelief is 
sin, indeed i t is Aie sin. I t is therefore a fact that we can speak of the truth of the 
Christian religion only within a doctrine of the.justificatio Impii. The statement that 
even Christianity is unbelief ^ves rise to a whole mass of muve and rationalising 
contradiction.^'But i t is this very fact that shows us how true and right the statement 
is'. (10) 
Grace, however, contradicts even man's own contradiction of i t . 
Christianity can therefore become the true religion as i t recognises the validity of the 
concept of Grace for the graceless. And yet even the recognitioii itself is an act of 
grace. And he adds this crucial statement: 'When we ground the truth of the 
Christian r eligion upon '^race, i t is not a question of the immanent truth of a religion 
of grace as such, but of the reality of the grace itself by which one religion is adopted 
and distinguished as the true one before all others'. (11) The crucial factor here is 
the way round that the statement is made: for Barth goes on in the next sentence 
to say ' I t is hot because i t is a religion of grace that this happens, nor is i t because it is 
so perhaps in a particularly insistent and logical way. But conversely, i t is because this 
happens that i t is a religion of grace in an insistent and logical way'. So i t is in the 
very action of Grace's exposing religion for what i t is that i t becomes possible for us 
to see that through a particular religion we are brought face to face with Truth, and 
therefore i t iis by this process that that religion may be identified as the true religion. 
To get the movement of Barth's thought absolutely clear, i t is necessary to quote him 
once again from the same section: ' I t is in this way, in the very encounter with God, 
(8) One influence on Barth to give such a prominent place to the doctrine of forgiveness in relation to true 
religion must surely be IVIartin Luther, who malces a direct connection between forgiveness, and true 
reiigioh: 'the true and only religion ... is to believe in the free forgiveness of our sins, without worlcs, 
out of pure grace alone .. To trust in this God who is gracious to us out of pure love and who does us 
good 'for nothing*; that is the true reiigioh and the true righteousness' tWerke Weimarer Ausgabe (1883) 
25.287].. Luther does not appear to use the term 'true religion' in as technical sense as does Barth, but 
the parallel is nonetheless a strong one, since it sets the context of true religion firmly in the court of the 
initiating grace of God. 
(9) . Church Dogmatics 1.2 p.337-8 
(10) Ibid 
(11) Ibid p.339 
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the site of which we call Peniel or, may i t be, Evangelical Reformed Christianity, 
that the face of God is seen, and therefore Peniel or Evangelical Reformed Christianity 
is the true reHgioh. But we must not forget that i t is not the symptoms, and therefore 
not the site that we call by this name, which demonstrate', the true religion, but 
that i t is the truth itself which is the basis of the symptoms, and distinguishes the site, 
so that we can call i t this without being tied down to the site and symptoms'. (12) 
This latest quotation seems to be of the utmost importance to our 
understanding of the concept of true religion, since i t seems to point the way for Barth's 
thinking to move forward, to explore the movement of Grace in the world, wherever 
and whenever i t is manifested. I t gives the lie once and for all to the idea that Barth's 
theology is static and only capable of interpretation within a strictly defined dogmatic 
formula - that of formal neo-protestantism with which his name is automatically 
associated. His primary concern is with the coming of grace and man's experience of that 
coming: that is the significance of Christ, and for that reason i t is to be explored within 
the context of the Christian religion. 
In this context the religious life of man is primarily one of response to a 
grace that is given. Thus at the heart of any true religion is a dynaihic and relational 
response, something constantly alive, and active in the present moment. The element 
of response is crucial, since i t makes a statement about the nature of man - that he 
is a relational being - and also because i t indicates that ultimately justification is not a 
man-centred concept, but a God-centred event. 
Barth illustrates this point by referring to two significant movements in the 
history of Buddhism. The cults of Yodo-Shin, and Yodo-Shui-Shu were established 
in the twelfth century on the belief that the earlier forms of Zen-Buddhism were too 
austere, and too demanding for the average person to be able to foUow. Redemption 
was by man's effort to follow the 'path of holiness'^ which was all but unattainable. 
The Genku reversed this approach by laying heavy stress on the promise of Amida that 
he would not rest t i l l all men shared with him in his enlightenment. Al l that the 
people had to do was to put their trust in Him, and thus accept the gift of life. Barth 
does not set this parallel up as an alternative True Religion to the Christian one 
rather, he uses i t to illustrate the massive about turn that this approach brought to 
the B u ^ s t religion in its time, and also to stress that the idea of the priority of grace 
is one that is not entirely exclusive to Christianity. However, he concludes at the end of 
his excursus on the subject that Yodoism cannot parallel Christianity as a f u l l religion 
of Grace, since only in Christianity is acknowledgement given to the act of Grace (not 
the concept alone) in the person of Jesus Christ. Once again i t is the act of relation in 
(12) Ibid p.339 
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die present to the person of Christ that finally allows the church to claim Christianity 
as the True Religion: 'the church listens to Jesus Christ' and also 'the church has to 
be weak in order to be strong' (13) 
in 
We have detected so far two major themes relation to true religion in Barth-
the priority of Grace, and its present experience. The final part of Barth's section under 
this title in the Church Dogmatics takes up the second of these themes in the context 
of the Church. So precise is the movement of his thought in this matter, that i t is well 
evQi\.k m the 
worth our while to quote once again: 'That there is a true religion is an^act of the grace 
of God in Jesus Christ. To be more precise, i t is an event in the outpouring of the Holy 
Spirit. To be even more precise^it is an event in the existence of the church and the 
children of God. The existence of the Church of God and the children of God means 
that true religion exists even in the world of human religion'. (14) The first part of 
this statement is once again laying down the grounds on which alone i t can be claimed 
that such a thing as true religion can exist at all. Jiist as man can only meet God as 
he is first met by Him, so the human structure of religion can only 'come alive' as life 
is given i t . Once again, this is not dualism that condemns all human matter to be 
of itself worthless and lifeless, but is rather an extension of a doctrine of creation that 
first of all acknowledges that God IS Creator, not merely that He WAS creator. We 
are dealing with an area in which Barth has constantly been misunderstood. What 
Barth is surely driving at is that every act of existence is only so because God is who 
He is — the Creator. Thus we see that the angle Barth is pursuing is not at all dissimilar 
to the distinction between I - T h o u and I - I t , as developed by Martin Buber, of which 
we shall be thinking more later. 
The second sentence in the passage quoted above refers to the life of the 
H d l y Spirit. The Spirit is seen as the outpouring of the Grace of God m Jesus Christ, 
and by connection with the next sentence, as the one intrinsically bound up with 
the life of the church. The Spirit is not only the simple fact of the existence of the life 
of the church, but i t is also the essential relationship between the church and God 
Himself. But i t is always God's Spirit, not the Church's, so that the very existence 
of the Church is itself is an act of Grace. And for that reason i t can be seen as the 
evidence of true religion. Thus the life of the true Church can only be effected as 
response to the free Grace of God, in that Grace. And the fact that the church does so 
live is not the basis of its life but sunply the fact of i t . It's basis is the Grace of God, 
which itself is identical to 'the name of Christ'; 
The relationship between the name of Christ and the Christian Church is 
the only basis on which i t can be considered,the true religion. Barth's stress on the idea 
(13) Ibid p.344 
(14) Ibid 
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of the 'name' of Christ is not insignificuit: the Old Testament concept of Naming 
implied not only a direct relation to the one named, but a recognition of the true 
standing of that person, and their right identity. Thus the Name of Jesus Christ 
takes on the significance of relating to those who recognise Jesus as the Christ. This 
implies a recognition, Barth tells us, that 'as the eternal Son of God he became man' 
and that in Him 'the revelation of God among men, and the reconciliation of man 
with God has been fulfi l led once and for all ', (is) Because of this there is a relation 
between the Name of Jesus Christ, and the Christian Religion. But this relation 
must be analysed very carefully, to avoid its misconstruction, and Barth attempts this 
in four ways. 
In the first instance the relationship between Christ and the Christian 
religion may be seen as an act of Creation. In a present act, Jesus Christ creates the 
Christian reiigioh. This is saying more than that there is simply an historical 
connection between the person of Jesus and the religion that subsequently grew in his 
honour. I t is also talking in a very contemporary way, in the light of what has already 
been mentioned ui connection with the Holy Spirit. For apart from its being continually 
brought into existence by the outpouring of the Grace of God in the Holy Spirit i t is 
once again ireduced to the level of unbelief. Or again to use the termmology of Martin 
Buber, the relationship I - T h o u is reduced to the state I - I t . Thus the name of 
Christ is not something that can be added to the Christian Religion to make i t True: 
i t is the very source and reality of the truth itself. Take away the name of Christ, 
and 'Christian theology loses the substance in virtue of which i t is hot philosophy, 
or philology, or historical science, but sacred learning*. (i6) 
Secondly, Barth suggests that there is an act of election intricately bound 
into the relation between Christ and the Christian reiigioh. Considered on its own, 
he tells us, Christianity is merely one possibility among many others. In itself i t has 
nothing particular to conunend i t . Therefore i f i t is real, in the sense in which we 
have seen i t to be an act of creation, then i t must also be something chosen freely by 
God for His own purposes. I t cannot in any way be deduced as an historical 
necessity f rom the history of Israel. This suggests that the line on which Barth is 
defining the state of true religion reflects his understanding of the character of God 
Himself, Creator and Elector (and, as we shall see, Justifier and Sanctifier). Once 
again we see Barth's metiiodology being employed not only to convey his argument 
but also in its very structure,tD reflect the argument itself. 
The third aspect of the relationship is tiiat i t reflects an act of justification, 
or foigiveness. In itself Christianity is quite unworthy of being the true religion. 
(15) Ibid p.345-6 
(16) . Ibid p.347. c.f. IVIartin Buber : Eclipse of God p.A6 
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Without Grace, i t remains entirely human. So its very reception of Grace reflects 
the fact that i t is already being forgiven, and is being offered life purely as the free 
activity o f God. We are dealing with a dynamic cycle, a relationship that exists 
only as all these separate elements are brought into constant new life. The one 
question that is relevant to the assessment of true religion is the status of its 
adherents in the eyes of God. And they of course, are forgiven by the judgement of 
God in Christ. Theu- religion is therefore 'True' since Truth is determmed by the 
judgement of God. Thus the life of the Church wil l only remain vital and True 
as long as the Church constantly roots itself in the forgiveness of God. 
The final aspect of the relationship allows us to see i t as an act of 
sanctification. The justification of the Church by Christ involves a positive relationship 
between the two. The recollection and expectation of revelation constantly re-
kindles the event itself. I t is not justified because i t is Holy; rather i t is made holy 
because i t is justified. So Barth again says ' I t is at this point we link up with what 
we earlier described as the twofold subjective reality of revelation, which is the 
counterpart in our realm of the objective revelation in Jesus Christ. The Christian 
Religion is the sacramental area created by the Holy Spirit, in which the God whose 
word became flesh continues to speak through the signs of his revelation.' (i7) 
In the light of what has gone before, and of Barth's criticisms of religion, 
what else can we say by way of summarising the meaning of the term 'true religion'? 
We have already mentioned in particular the fact that true religion demands an 
understanding of the Priority of Grace, and also a setting that is in the living present. 
To take the above four-fold analysis of the relationship between Christ and the 
Church a step further, we must see i t as highly significant that the four parts are 
very much intier-related, so much so that we can really only talk of them in terms 
of a dynamic cycle - a cycle in which each one is feeding the others and without 
which the others would be unable to stand alone. Whereas in his conunentary on the 
Episfle to the Romans Barth was able to describe Religion as 'the crater left after the 
shell had exploded', he has now gone on to describe the intiemal dynamics of the explosion 
itself. But of course the very point that he is making is emphasised - the danger of 
true religion becoming mere religion - by the very way he has described the process. 
Is i t ever possible to record, to pin down and make permanent, the dynamic state 
to which he refers? To quote Heinz Zahmt 'Is i t in any sense possible to "draw the 
bird in flight"? This is to ask for speech about what cannot be uttered. This was the 
problem Barth was bound to see himself faced with as a theologian in regard to 
this *permanent actualism': "Does one single word of mine formulate the Word after 
which I am striving, and which I long to utter in my misery and hope? Does not each 
(17) 1.2 p.359 
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sentence I frame require another to dissolve its meaning?" (18) Zahmt unplies that 
Barth does not answer this point, and remains a victim of his own problem. However, 
we suspect that Barth would be among the first to admit the danger, but also to point 
out that rather than attempting to 'draw the bird in flight', he is attempting to outline 
the conditions under which the bird may be free to fly again. 
Taking up Barth's exploration of Justification, i t is worth noting a comment 
made by Paul Tillich m his book The Protestant Era in the section on the theme of 
the Boundary Situation: The profoundest aspect of justification in bur situation and 
for the men of today is that we can discern God at the very moment when all known 
assertions about 'God' have lost their power'. (19) There must here be an echo of all 
that Tillich owes to Barth, and i t is particularly significant that he links up the idea 
of justification with that of the boundary situiation: for as Barth went to such lengths 
to point out in Chapter 7 of Per Romerbrief reiigioh takes man to the very frontier 
o f human experience, and there exposes to him the redundancy of his own resources. 
Only then is he receptive to the incoming Grace, or justification of God. A t this point 
the negative content of 'religion' and the positive value of 'true reiigioh' highlight.... 
the critical significance of the Frontier itself. 
The existence of true religion is not an accident that is tacked on to the end 
of Barth's lengthy criticism of the concept, but as we saw earlier i t is an integral part 
of that criticism. I n fact i t is an integral part of the doctrine of God and of the 
Incarnation. That doctrine would itself be void were there to be no possibility for 
true reiigioh, for i t reflects the way in which man can live in livihg relationship with 
God. The problem has been referred to elsewhere in terms of the subject-understanding 
of God being reduced to an object-understanding. Thus Gogarten has written of the 
easy confusion 'which infiltrates not only theology, but uifluences everyone who not 
only relates himself to revelatioh in belief (that is, aDows i t to be the subject), but also 
thinks about i t , and makes.it ian object. And who does not repeatedly fall from the 
posture of belief to that of thought and knowledge'. (20) 
Finally we must look at the implications of Barth's understanding of true 
religibh for the understanding of God's revelation to man. We have aheady looked 
at Barth's comments on the relatioh between the name of Jesus and the existence of a 
conununity of faith. We noted that the name was significant ui that i t unplied 
'standing in relation' to, and 'giving worth to' : this seems to us to unply primarily 
a relatiohship to the 'contemporaneous Christ 'm the living present, and then 
subsequently a connection between that and the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Being a member of the conmiunity of faith is a factor of the mitiating Grace of God 
(18) H . Zahmt The Question of God p39 ' 
(19) - P. Tillich . The Protestant Era. R201 
(20) F. Gogarten, in .The Beginninos of Dialectical Theolonv' Ed. Robinson Jn Knox Press, p.118 
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experienced at the frontier of a man's human capability, and not iminediately of 
man's ability to associate that confrontation by the divine, with the historical 
person of Jesus. That becomes part of the process of supplying a theological 
structure within which the encounter can be understood and responded to. Yet 
i t lis the very person of Jesus that allows this to be possible. This is of critical 
importance to the way in which Barth's thinking has been taken forward by the 
proponents of 'reUgionless Christianity' — notably Bonhoeffer and Tillich, both of 
whom owe an enormous amount to Barth. This is a very helpful step forward, suice 
i t allows the debate about religion genuinely to step outside the limitations of dogma 
and formulary, and to move more dvectiy into the field of relation and non-relation, 
which as we have already seen is where the initial encounter with God is most 
normally experienced. (21) Theological doctrine, as Barth points out at the end 
of his section on true religion is vital in that i t must reflect the reconciling and 
sanctifying work of Christ in the community, but is in ho way crucial to proving 
Christianity to be the true religion. 
(21) Thus by moving a stage back from the "dead letter" syndrome re. 'Religion' the issue-is freed to turn 
on the question of whether God Initiates an activity, or whether man attempts to seize the initiative 
for himself . The former is relational, the latter denies relation. 
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b) The Significance of Martin Buber for developmg Barth's 
concept and criticism of religion. 
In our study of Barth's concept of true religion, several themes became 
dominant. Religion in its positive 'true' sense was that which did hot exist by and in 
itself, but was witnessed to by the existence of the church and the children of God. 
I t was something fundamentally initiated by God and active in response to his 
initiation in Grace. We noticed also Barth's constant attention to the fact that i t 
existed in the living present, and was a contemporaneous and regenerating event. I t 
was a dynamic function inextricably linked to the name of Jesus Christ; and i t existed 
within the intier-relationship between creation, election, forgiveness, and sanctification. 
We have also noted earlier that much of the thinking that influenced Barth, 
as his understanding of the subject developed, derived f rom the dialectical thought of 
Kierkegaard. I t was this that allowed Barth's theology to move mtb the context of 
the living present as its primary arena, backed up by the inter-relationship between this 
present, and the movement of history - particularly the history of revelation. For in 
the final analysis Barth's theology is one of revelation, and man's response m Grace 
to that revelation of Grace. And revelation is received through man's being encountered 
by God, in the present, at the pouit at which he has reached the limit of his own human 
resources as they fmally highlight theu: own bankruptcy. 
Religion is lifeless except life be given i t by God. This is a theme that is 
echoed again and agaui in the writings of Martin Buber, the Jewish Philosopher-
Theologiah, to whom reference has already been made several times. In fact the 
conunon cause discovered between these two men is quite remarkable, considering the 
differences of their backgrounds and traditions, and that they had littie i f any personal 
relationship during their lifetimes. The themes mentioned above as emeiging from 
Barth's discussion of True Religion also reflect many of the major interests of Buber: 
immediacy, response, relation, contemporaneity, and so on. I t seems well worth while 
looking a little more closely at the parallels and differences between them, to see what 
light they can throw on the ways in which the duection of Barth's criticism of religion 
can best be taken forward. 
Let us look first at Buber's background, and set his teaching in its true 
context. Much of his early mspuation was drawn from the Jewish Hasidic tradition, 
which placed much stress not on pantheism, but on panentheism - a mystical tradition 
that explored the presence of the divine in every situation. His linderstanduig of the 
presentness of the divine experience was taken further by the overall Jewish stress on the 
value of the deed done, not the faith i t expressed. To Buber's early thinkuig, Maurice 
Fried mann tells us, good is decision, while evil is du^ctionlessness. (i) Much stress is 
(1). M.Friedmann Martin Buber - The life of Dialogue RKP p J I 
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also put on the idea of encounter, which is seen as something dangerous, since i t leads to 
an exposed existence: this brings the key moment right into the living present, enabling 
him to say 'Godless is the theologian who places his God in causality'. (2) 
Buber derived much mspiratioh from Kierkegaard, as did Barth, but not 
surprisingly, the difference in the traditions of these two men led them to move on 
f rom Kierkegaard in rather different du-ections. Barth took up, in particular, the 
concept of paradox, and the dialectic^, method, while Buber moved from the idea of the 
tension of opposites to the discovery of the possibility of meeting 'ui-between' - f rom 
dialectic to dialogic. In this hiovement he was also influenced by Simmel and Feuerbach,(3) 
the latter of whom had earlier led the way away from understanding man in purely 
individualistic terms. 
Buber published his book 'Ich und Du' in 1923, though, as Kaufmann 
points out in his ihtroductioh to that work, the earlier draft was on paper in 1919, as part 
of a larger work, which he abandoned on the ground that i t was becoming over-
systematic. I t is interesting that the year prior to the publication of Ich und Du, unknown 
to Buber, an Austrian by the name of Ebner had published a book in which he pointed 
to the vital significance of the 'Thou' - the actual encounter with the other person -
to modem thought. (4) In 1923 also, and unknown to either of the others, 
Gabriel Marcel also explored and wrote about the concept of the 'Thou'. Buber develops 
his thinking further than the others, and his starting point is the belief that die 
subject-object distinction that had dominated epistemology since Greek-times, is a false 
one. Rather man is equipped to approach life with two different attitudes, which he 
defines wi th the primary word-pairs 'I-You*(here following Kaufmann's preference 
for 'You ' over 'Thou') ^ d ' I—It ' . ' I perceive something. I feel something. I imagine 
something. I want something... The life of a human being does not consist merely of 
all this and its like. AU this and its like is the basis of the reahn of I t . But the realm 
of You has another basis'. (5) But, 'whoever says You does not have something for his 
object. For wherever there is something, there is also another something; every I t 
borders on other Its; I t is only by virtue of bordering on others. But where You is 
said there is no something. You has no borders. Whoever says You does not have 
something; he has nothing. But he stands in relation.' (6) ^ 
For a marked parallel to Barth's stress on the Subjecthood of God, we should 
look in particular at the way Buber understands the word-pair I -Thou to be 
significant of far more than just the call and response between two people, or a person 
and what is over agauist hinu (7)^^; In every act of relation I -Thou , there is the element 
(2) fcf. Feuerbach - Frowmanns Philosophische Taschenbu cher 1.2 p.37. Stuttgart 1922; ' 
(3) Ibid p.41,68 . 
(4) Ebner: Das Wort und die ^  »istigen Realitaten - Pneumiatalogische Fragmente 1921 ' 
(5) . Buber: I and Thou tr. Kaufmann E 8i T Clark 1970 p54 
(6) Ibid p.55 
(7) For which, only a careful reading of .I and Thou is appropriate: 
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of response to what Buber calls the 'Eternal Thou': the eternal Thou is that which 
cannot become an I t . In other words i t exists only in relation - i t can only be 
addressed. This is how Buber talks of God. ' In every sphere, through everything 
that becomes present to us, we gaze towards the train of the eternal You; in each we 
perceive a breath of i t ; in every You we address the eternal You, m every sphere 
accordmg to its manner'. (8) Thus in every moment of relation, there is the element 
of response to the Eternal, and there is a giving and receiving of bemg. Of 
particular interest to our discussion of religion, is the idea that the Eternal Thou 
is that which cannot become an I t . In other words God cannot be reduced to an 
object, to an experience, to being merely information. In that case the word simply 
becomes devoid of its content. What must be given up in man is the self-asserting 
instinct 'that makes a man flee to the possessing of things before the unreliable 
perilous world of relation', (o) 
I t is with this idea that the paraUels between Barth and Buber become 
important. Despite the differences of tradition, background and methodology, both 
men are passionately concerned with the living element of the divine-human encounter. 
I t is worth contrasting once agaui the passages to which reference has already been made 
separately. In the Church Dogmatics, Barth says 'the problem of religion is sunply a 
pointed expression of man in his encounter and conununion with God. I t is therefore 
a chance to fall uito temptation. Theology and the church and faith are invited to 
abandon theu- theme and object and to become hollow and empty and mere shadows 
of themselves.' (io) And Buber makes a similar observation thus : 'Religion as risk, 
ready to give itself up is the nourishing stream of the arteries; as system, possessmg, 
assured and assuring, religion which believes in religion is the veui's blood which ceases 
to circulate. And i f there is nothing that can so hide the face of our feUow man as 
morality can, religion can hide from us as nothing else can, the face of God'. (i i) 
Again we might contrast Buber's statement that 'Dogma, even when its 
claim of origin remains uncontested, has become the most exalted form of invubierability 
against revelation', (12) with Barth's suggestion that questions of canon and dogma 
are only secondary to the establishment of True Religion and indeed may be the very 
denial of i t . (i3) While the precise context of Barth's remark relates to the establishment 
of The ' true religion, i t is nonetheless relevant in that 'the true religion' is true only 
insofar as 'true religion* can be a part of it .(i4) 
Mention has aheady been made of two other significant passages showuig 
the common theme between Barth and Buber at this point, the one relatmg to Buber's 
demonstration of how God removes himself from lifeless formulae, the other being the 
(8) . .1 and Thou p.57 cJ. also p.150 
(9) Friedrhann op.cit:p.70 ? 
(10) Church Dogmatics 13 p.283 
(11) Buber : Between Mm and M an Fontana 1961 p.36 
(12) Ibid 
(13) Church Dogmatics 1.2 p.360-1 
(14) c.f. the parable of 'organisation' at Sawston School, in E M Forster's The Longest Journey Penguin p.48 
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comment from Gogarten about the dialectic method which so much influenced 
Barth. (is) A further, and perhaps more interesting parallel may be found between 
Buber's idea of the Eternal Thou standing In-between' two parties to a relation 
(compare ' In the beginhing is the relation' (i6) and Barth's comments on how religion 
(as the law) hinders the activity of revelation: 'Nor has religion difficulty in answering 
objections to this or that particular form in which i t presents itself, for i t is in religion 
that human capacity appears most pure, strong, penetrating and adaptable. Religion 
is the ability of men to receive and to retain an impress of God's revelation .... the law 
then, precisely as this human possibility, has entered between'. (17)) As the law is 
likened in Barth to religion, and religion is the human opposition to revelation, so i t 
may be seen that i t lis within Barth's position to see revelation as being the 'in-between' 
of the divine-human encounter. Thus the significant parallel is that the activity of 
the divine is once again seen to be in the sphere of the living present, and is part of a 
relatiohal dynamic. 
When Barth speaks of the problem of attempting to 'capture the bird in 
fl ight ' , he raises a problem of which he and Buber remain in the end divided. There 
are occasiohs for Barth where God has to become an object, i f the overall Subjecthood 
of God is finally to be preserved. Buber finds i t difficult to allow the term God to 
have any meaning when i t is used in the sense of being an 'It* for purposes of 
descriptioh: he does however confess to the need to be able to speak about God as 
well as to God. His fear is that God wi l l be turned into an object of 'faith* where faith 
means no more than assent to a belief. This would reduce God to the level of being an 
object of knowledge, a piece of informatioh. The danger of faith, thus understood 
by Buber, is that i t first completes, but then replaces flie act of relation. Tillich 
pursues the same idea in these words: 'Resting in belief in an I t takes the place of the 
continually, renewed movement of the beuig towards concentration, and going out to 
the relation*. (I8) This lis not a far-cry. from the 'critical turn of Barth*s religion. However, 
on Buber*s argument, Barth falls into the trap of redudng relation^to faith (though 
not on Barth's definition of faith), b^Kncon Barth's promise of God constantly coming 
to man where his own securities are left behind, Buber's position is uiadequate unless 
he finhly commits himself to God's being Subject in the act of relation. This in the 
end is an irreconcil able difference between the two men, but i t is a difference based 
on how they reached their positions, not on what their respective positions say to the 
problem of religion. Where their worlds meet is in,agreement that God is met in a 
dynamic act of relation, in a meeting of claim and response. 
Further light on the understanding of religion is thrown by considering the 
doctrine of revelatioh in both men. To Barth, as we have observed throughout our study, 
(15) c.f. section on true Religion refs. 16 &.20. 
(16) : . I and Thou p.69: 
(17) ' Barth: Der Romerfarief p.i83-4 
(18) . Tillich: Systematic Theology 1. p.113 
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religion is opposed to revelation: revelation is the coming of God ui Grace when the 
activity of religion has made its critical turn against itself, leaving man totally exposed 
at the frontier of his own experience and ability. The life of God is received in 
revelation both ui the 'years of revelation' - the life of the incarnate Christ - and also 
in the ongoing life of the Church. 
Barth's re-affirmation of a doctrine of revelation was one of the key 
turning-points in the history o f theology; however he was not alone at the time in 
meetuig the attacks of philosophy and psychology head-on. Buber also had a strong 
belief in a doctrine of revelation, though i t was less explicitly worked out. In the final 
analysis the question that Buber acknowledges as important is whether the doctrine 
of ' I - T h o u ' is contained entirely within the horizontal cross-reference of inter-personal 
experience, or whether that which comes 'm-between' comes from a reveaUng God -
or as he would more happily say 'the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob'. He puts the 
matter like this: 'Men who are still 'religious' in such times usually fail to realise that the 
relation conceived of as religious no longer exists between them and a reality independent 
of them, but has existence only vrithin the mind - a mind which at the same time 
contains hypostasised imiages, hypostasised 'ideas''. (ig) 
The basis of Buber's doctrine of revelation seems to be couched in the actual 
relation I - T h o u : this cannot of itself be reduced to a mere concept, since of itself i t 
has its being In-between'. In this first instance this does preclude a purely self-sufficient 
concept of beuig human, though at this stage i t has nothing to say against the 
possibility of its reflecting merely a corporate humanity, that would still be criticised 
by Barth for bemg anthropocentric, not theocentric. However we find that Buber 
takes the matter rather further: ' In the committed I -Thou relation there is knowing 
access to a reality which is otherwise inaccessible; that uncommitted 'objective' 
knowledge which observes as an I t what may also be encountered as a Thou is a lesser 
kind of knowledge, and that the most profound mistake in all philosophy is the 
epistemological reduction of I -Thou to I - I t knowledge, and the metaphysical reduction 
of Thou to I t . ' (20) Buber is here clearly taUdng of a different form of knowledge 
altogether, f rom that of rational enquiry, a knowledge that is receded ui the 'in-between' (21) 
a concept that throws helpful light on our approach to the meaning of Barth's 
understanding of a God of Revelation. 
E.L. Fackenheun ui his article on 'Buber's concept of Revelation' suggests that 
to establish the validity of Buber's concept of revelation i t is necessary first to show 
that I - T h o u is a religious category, and that religion is not identical to the I - I t state; 
alsOj secondly, we must show what criteria separate religion from other I-Thou*s, and^ 
(18) Tillich: Systematic Theology 1.p.113 
(19) Buber:.Eclipse of God Harper Torchbooks; p.13. 
(20) ; Quoted in E.L. Fackenheim's article 'Buber's Concept of Revelation' in Schiipp, The Philosophy of Martin 
. Buber p.281 
(21) c.f. John Taylor's concept of the Spirit 'in-between', in The Go-betiween God. SCM 1973, ch.1. 
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tiiirdly^we must locate revelation within the category of I -Thou . (22) The concept 
is at once taken out of the court of the purely intra-petsonal in this way: 'Feelings 
are a mere accompaniment to the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of the relation 
which is fulfil led not in the soul, but between the I and the Thou.' (i23) These words 
echo those of Buber himself in relation to marriage, where he mamtains that the 
relatiohship cannot be based on feelings alone, but on what is actually revealed one 
to the other. Buber quite clearly takes i t beyond a merely inter-personal event, 
to include in that event what is its very basis, an act of receiving: 'even the combination 
of both (feelings and institutions) still does not create human life, which is created 
only by a third element-the central presence of the You, or rather, to speak more 
truthfully, the central You that is received in the present. (24) Further, what is 
received is also that which is 'addressed' to the parties in the relation. Buber is anxious 
to avoid the idea of revelation being something that is quite distinct from the human 
involvement, but rather the address is of a Thou who is in what he communicates. A t 
first sight this might appear to be in durect opposition to Barth's understanding of 
revelation as that which is the coming of God into a human situation, but on a closer 
look we discover that once again the duection of what the two men are saying is 
parallel, each from his own tradition. For in the end what could be closer than for 
Buber to allow that all response to the Thou reduces i t , and binds i t to the It-world, 
and for Barth to maintain that revelation only takes place at the limit and frontier 
of man*s.independent existence? In each case the value of a person's independent 
autonomous existence is undermined, and the centre of existence is shifted to that 
which comes to the individual, effecting a dynamic relation. 
What distinguishes the religious 'Thou' from other 'Thou's' ? For i f nothing, 
then indeed we are left with a mere system^with Barth's 'religion', in which the idea of 
the Thou becomes a mere fancy once again. For Buber, God is posited as the Thou 
who cannot become an I t . He is therefore the Moment God, known in the very act of 
relatioh alone; to reduce the name to mere information is to evacuate i t of all true 
meaning. (25) However, this runs the danger of the understanding of God becoming 
entirely mystical, and so Buber maintains that in the moment of revelation, no I t can 
retain its independence. In the act of revelation every I t becomes a symbol through 
which God speaks. But the symbol is not known ui thought rismg above the 
encounter itself. 
Fackenheim mauitains that i t is the wrong question i f we ask i f the 
revelation exists independent of the response. For he maintains that Buber claims 
(22) ' c.f. which, for what follows -
(23) Fackenheim, op. cit. p.283.. 
(24) ' I. and Thou p55 
(25) . Eclipse of. God p.45^ . 
75. 
revelation to be an address to a Thou (26) ; Revelation needs its Thou, but (and this 
seems to echo Barth's doctrine of Grace), 'Being a Thou' is not a human activity per se, 
but is itself a product of revelation. And so he aptly quotes Buber :'(God) is the 
Infinite I that makes every I t his Thou' (27), and'In order to speak to man God must 
become a person; but in order to speak to him, he must make him also a person'. (28) 
Fackenheun's conclusion is that Buber's doctrine of revelation cannot be 
philosophically established beyond all doubt, and that in the end his critique of the 
I - I t stance is based upon I - I t methodology. This may be a correct judgement, 
but i t is not necessarily one that Buber would be unhappy with, since i f revelation 
were finally and philosophically established, we would in the process of so doing have 
reduced i t f rom its capacity to contain the Thou, and would have tied i t once again 
to the world of I t . This backs up Fackenheun's conclusion that m the end ui Buber 
we are dealing not with a pure philospher, but with a Hebrew sage speaking from 
within the position of a living commitment to the God of Israel, which again confirms 
the validity of paralleling his approach to that of Karl Barth. 
Thus i t is clear that Barth and Buber share some elements of a common 
understanding of the doctrine of revelation. Both maintain that i t is the coming of 
God to man that establishes identity and being; both agree that revelation is a 
relational activity, initiated in the Eternal, and worked out ui the dynamic of call 
and response; and both admit to the priority of the grace that flows out to men. 
Where they differ, as they clearly do in origui, i t is on the degree to which the 
dialectic principle is applied, and the measure to which the ' in between' is seen as 
related to or distinct f rom the two poles that i t separates. 
However, in our search to understand the meanmg of true religion i t 
seems important to recognise the differences between the two men, and to explore 
a way forward in the light of what each is saymg to the other. Barth's particular 
emphasis in the light of all the history on which his outlook rests, is that the 
absolute priority and subjectivity of God must be mamtamed ui our understandmg 
of the human situation. Thus his position would have to criticise Buber for bemg 
unwilling openly to define God as the Other, independent of his revelation, or of 
the human response to His revelation. Also he would see i t as a human limitation 
placed upon God i f we mainfeiined that God can only be known to exist in the moment 
of encounter, and that outside the encounter there is no knowuig the divine at aU. 
(26) Fackenheim 6p.cit: p.288 
(27) Between Wan and Wan p.56 . 
(28) • Buber; The Prophetic.Faith Macmillan 1949 (N.V.) p.164. 
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Buber m his turn would be unable to accept Barth's stress on an objective 
revelation through the Incarnation, since this would be to reduce revelation to an I t -
state in historical terms, and would place too great a stress on a particular moment of 
revelation at the expense of all the others. Further he would not be able to tolerate 
the separation that Barth demands between the activity of God and the activity of man. 
Thus i f the positive side of Barth's argument is to stress the subjecthood of God and 
the initiative of his Grace, the great value of Buber's position is to explore the way 
in which the revelation does take place among men; and also to locate real living -
true life, or even trae religion — in a relational sphere. 
Having already highlighted the central point.that we feel the two men to 
be moving in the same direction from different positions, the criticisms that each 
offers to the othei^ position do not demand an exclusivist distinction between them, 
but they effectively speak to each other in a dynamic relation of theur own. For 
the insights of the I - T h o u model applied to Barth's method open i t up to a new 
understanding, and the parallels between the language that each has used (see above) 
throw light on each other. For example, Buber's analysis of history in terms of I t -
information that can ever and again become a Thou in the present allows a 
glimpse of what Barth means by talking of revelation m the life of Jesus Christ, and 
revelation in the living experience of the church. And indeed the doctrine of Incamation 
in Barth is not nearly | o exclusively objective as i t at first appears i f the inter-relation 
between history and the present, the particular and the general, is allowed its own 
dialogic. 
Finally, i t is interesting to note Buber's comments on Christianity. His chief 
problem is to understand how Christians try to limit the self-revelation of God to one 
period of thirty years. (29) He accepts the Hebrew concept of Faith (Emunah), 
but objects to what he sees as the Hellenism of Pau& concept - Pistis. However^ i t is 
perhaps a significant contribution from the whole tradition of Protestantism that lay 
behind Barth, that faith be seen far more as response in relation, than the placing of 
confidence in a series of statements or pieces of 'information'. But his deep understanding 
of Christianity, and his attitude to i t are best expressed in his own words, which 
indicate the great value to Christian theology of all that he was : 'From my youth 
onwards I have found in Jesus my great brother. That Christianity has regarded and 
does regard him as God and Saviour has always appeared to me of the highest 
importance, which for his sake and my own I must endeavour to understand. My own 
fraternally open relationship to him has become ever stronger and clearer, and today I 
see him more strongly and clearly than ever before* (30) . 
(29) c.f. Friedmann op. cit. p.286 f f . 
(30) Buber: Two types of faith. RKP 1951, p.12 
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From the discussion above i t is clear to us that the categories used by 
Martin Buber are a useful and viable set of tools which can enable us to take 
forward Barth's concept of religion and seek to understand its significance more 
fu l ly , without beuig unfak either to Karl Bartii or Martin Buber. 
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CONCLUSION 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF BARTH'S CONCEPT 
& CRITICISM OF RELIGION FOR THE CONTEMPORARY CHURCH 
The purpose of this study has been to understand the significance of Barth's 
concept and criticism of religion. Just as the problem for Barth was raised in a pastoral 
context, so it has been for us. And just as for Barth the criticism of religion he offered 
spoke directly and meaningfully to the task upon which he was engaged, so his 
conclusions demand that we also seek to apply them to our contemporary situation. 
In detail this is beyond the scope of our study, but i t must be an integral part of the 
study at least to point the way in which his argument is directing our thinking. 
In the course of our study we have looked at Barth's problem, set it in 
historical context, and compared and contrasted the ways ui which Barth approaches 
it in different pieces of his writuig. We have looked at the theological development 
Barth outlines behind the growth of 'religion*, and seen the way the nineteenth century 
was a key period in the development of the problem. We noted the polarisation 
brought about by Barth's break with his theological ancestry, and looked carefuUy 
at the implications of the methodology he employs. Finally, we have looked at the 
positive side of his 'criticism', and sought ways of allowing his concern for the living 
present to go beyond even his own times. Hence the forward looking note of this 
conclusion is offered as an integral part of the study we have undertaken. 
First of all, our study has indicated that the problem of religion is a far 
deeper one than being merely about institutions. In its essence the problem is one 
of priorities - whether in all our thinking, all our methodology, and all our 
community life, God is ultimately prior, always the Initiator, always the Revealer. 
The great reversal of history has been the systematic reduction of our doctrine 
of God til l he is lieft not as God but the principle, the logical necessity at the end 
of the chain of human reason. Barth's cry to the theologians, and to the lay 
Christians of his day was concerned with the sovereignty of God. 
Barth's concept of true religion indicates clearly that the Church is an 
institution, a human institution, but that it becomes The Church only through the 
fourfold activity of God in creation, election, justification and sanctification. But 
in response to the activity of God the Church has to reflect in its own internal 
structure and existence the fact that it's existence in any sense as 'triie' is dependent 
on that fourfold activity of God. This activity of God is a dynamic one, rooted in the 
basic movement of call and response, and so we may conclude that the institution 
we call the Church must root its institutional life primarily in an attitude of 
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responsiveness, that is always placing itself freely under the judgement and reconciliation 
of Gdd. This means that Barth's concept of religion amounts to an attack not upon 
institutions in themselves, but upon institutionalism. The difference is that 
institutions, human as they are, are capable of being shaped and used by the living 
Giurch in response to the fourfold activity of God, whereas mstitutiohalism by its very 
nature denies the element of response, and feeds purely upon the closedness of the 
human order. 
Qearly that is by no means aU that needs to be said about the life of the 
institutional church, but i t is the significant starting point that is highlighted in Barth's 
concept and criticism of religion as we have understood it, and on that level it 
provides a substantial take-off point for contemporary thinking, albeit outside the scope 
of our present brief. 
Barth has maintained that self-communication is part of the three-fold nature 
of God: i t lis of His own choice and will that He is a revealing God. And Barth has shown 
us in his study of'the problem of religion in theology that there has been a long and 
subtie historical process by which the actual self-communication of God to men has 
been replaced by a bogus form of communication of the knowledge of God, in 
that the church has sought to pass on from generation to generation it s understanding 
of revelation, rather than to allow that revelation to take place anew and afresh to 
each succeeding generation. In other words the vehicles of communication have been 
reduced from their true function to being handed on as the conmiunication itself. 
Religion is the indication that God has been squeezed out of the very vehicles he 
might have used for his own self-communication. Hence Barth's insistence that 
revelation was not historically confined to the 'years of revelation', but is also present 
in the life of the (true) Giurch. 
Now we have concluded, in our section on 'true religion*, that the significant 
aspect of the divine-human encounter is that it takes place in the living present: man 
is confronted by God, as he is where he is, and the communication is received in an 
inter-personal and relational sense, reflecting the 'contemporaneity' of Christ. I t is 
received and responded to on the gut-level. There is then involved a human process 
by which that encounter is handled psychologically, emotionally, and intellectually, 
and at any of these levels 'religion' in the sense that Barth uses it raises it s ugly head 
and threatens disaster. There is a constant danger of the language, the categories 
and the symbols with which the moment of revelation is handled seizing the revelation 
and seeking to displace it. The history of the church in the present century is riddled 
with evidence of this process. 
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The problem facing the Church in the light of all this iis just how does it, 
as a human institution seeking to reflect its intiemal experience of divine revelation, 
arrange its structures, language and creeds to allow the Holy Spirit freedom to 
encounter men and women as and where they are. I t is the same problem, in 
different guise, that society faces as a whole in seeking or organise its social structures 
in such a way as to allow people living within them the maximum freedom to explore 
the significance of life in the context of justice freedom and truth. 
While Barth does not answer these questions directiy in his critique of 
religion, there is one key point that does emerge: religion, likei the Pauline concept 
of 'flesh*, has something basically to do with being human. Religion, in its attempt 
to displace God from his position of ultimate priority, reflects the fallen nature 
of mankind. Religion can only become 'true' as it is itself placed under its own 
judgement (the critical turn it makes against itself) and under the judgement of 
revelation. But the judgement of revelation, Barth maintains, carries with it the 
possibility of redemption, again through the fourfold activity of creation, election, 
justification and sanctification. So just as there is by this the possibility of 'true' 
religion, so the structures life and language of the Church also have the possibility 
of validity, as they themselves come under the criticism of religion, and the judgement 
of revelation. This will imply that all human structures can and must only be 
provisional in nature, capable and ready to dissolve themselves as and where they 
cease to serve the contemporaneous encounter with Christ. 
Thirdly, while it is clear that Barth uisists that God's self-communication 
to man depends upon his will and revelation, it is hone-the-Iess clear that there is a 
problem for Christian proclamation in the method by which preaching is undertaken -
as Barth clearly was aware through his experiences in SafenwU. The problem is by 
no means unrelated to the points aheady mentioned above, but it is helpful to 
look particularly at the implications of Barth*s doctrine of revelation. Revelation 
may be defined as that process by which man is confronted by God, and by the 
ultimate truth about himself and his significance. This confrontation can only take 
place, we have discovered from Biarth, at the frontier, the limit, of man's own 
possibility. Therefore the confrontation comes in the form of threat, risk, and 
holy insecurity. I t is our contention that it iis precisely because it comes in this way, 
that i t is of supreme relevance to our modem urban-church situation. 
For threat and insiecurity lie at the heart of urban man's life-style and 
situation. He is threatened by the insiecurity of his employment; by his forced 
dependence upon others in the City playing their part; by his lack of knowledge of 
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the issues putting equal pressures on others in his Qty; by a souless concrete 
jungle, and by a lack of say in his own destiny. In the face of this, he withdraws 
into what littie security he has, and he fights to preserve it, domesticaUy, 
economically and politically. / 
In the threat, the revelation of God is ah-eady making its presence 
felt, but it offers a radical alternative to the withdrawal (which is not a far cry from 
'religion'). Barth's critique of religion is crucial here because it sets out the priority 
of the encounter by God with man where he really is. The method by which that 
encounter is made articulate and concrete is secondary to the fact that it happens. 
I t is reduced to religion as soon as a particular form or model is laid down outside 
of which i t cannot be articulated. Part of the church's four-fold response must 
therefore be to constantly place its own forms, models and symbols under the 
same threat and confrontation in it's attempt to respond to the grace which can 
enable i t to be in any sense 'true'. 
FinaUy, we would do Barth a great injustice were we not to add that no 
statement we make or conclusion we draw from our study of the concept and 
critidsni of religion can be called final. All we have written, the judgements we 
have made and the conclusions we have drawn, must themselves be constantly 
placed under the same threat, the same question-mark, lest they too rise up and 
seize for themselves the finality that belongs only to God. 
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